Applying Some Lessons from the Gulf Oil Spill to Hydraulic Fracturing by Robertson, Heidi Gorovitz
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 63 | Issue 4
2013
Applying Some Lessons from the Gulf Oil Spill to
Hydraulic Fracturing
Heidi Gorovitz Robertson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Applying Some Lessons from the Gulf Oil Spill to Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1279 (2013)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol63/iss4/12
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
1279 
Applying Some Lessons  
from the Gulf Oil Spill  
to Hydraulic Fracturing 
Heidi Gorovitz Robertson† 
“If the . . . oil boom is a classic Greek drama, the second act is starting 
now, and the prairie chorus is once again issuing a warning.” * 
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Introduction 
Hydraulic fracturing of shale is huge these days in Ohio—or at least 
it promises to be huge. News accounts, politicians, environmentalists, 
and business interests either laud it or revile it. Some say it will save 
Ohio’s economy. Those with business interests in the hydraulic 
fracturing industry say it will usher in a new economy based on oil and 
gas exploration and production. They say an economic boom will trail 
them as they work to locate oil and gas entrapped in shale rock and 
entice it to the surface. They will tempt it to the surface using a 
controversial technology that, although not entirely new, is newly 
combined with another technology—horizontal drilling. Some insist 
that hydraulic fracturing will ruin Ohio’s environment and endanger its 
citizens. They argue that the wells drilled for hydraulic fracturing are 
not sufficiently secure to protect the groundwater resources through 
which they will pass, and that shocks to the earth allegedly caused by 
high pressure underground injection of chemical laced waste water can 
cause earthquakes and other terrestrial disturbances. 
Ohio is rushing towards hydraulic fracturing of horizontal wells at 
lightning speed, and some argue it has insufficiently considered and 
managed that rush in light of the potentially disastrous, albeit unlikely, 
consequences of groundwater contamination, explosion at wells or 
drilling sites, depletion of freshwater supply as high volumes are used in 
fracturing, and disposal of contaminated flowback water. Similarly, 
although drilling for oil from deepwater rigs was neither a new idea nor 
a new technology when the Deepwater Horizon blew out on April 20, 
2010—killing 11 people, spewing tons of oil in the Gulf of Mexico, and 
sinking a $50 million drilling rig—most deepwater wells that preceded 
it had not been drilled quite so deeply into the seafloor. Many of the 
technologies employed there were untested at such great depths, and 
regulation and enforcement had not kept pace with the advances in 
technology. This Article will consider just a few of the lessons identified 
through government and other studies that followed the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill. It will consider how those lessons might be applied to 
Ohio’s regulation of hydraulic fracturing in the hope that Ohio can 
avoid some of the same mistakes that arguably paved the way for the 
blowout in the Gulf.  
There are many lessons to be learned from the Gulf Coast spill. 
Quite understandably, several government task forces have filled 
whole books with those lessons. This Article focuses on only a few of 
the lessons exposed in those reports. It will address some of the 
lessons that might apply as Ohio moves quickly to support and to 
regulate the developing shale oil and gas industry. In particular, this 
Article discusses three areas of potential concern: agency structure 
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and responsibility, inadequacies in research or follow though, and 
emergency planning and preparedness for disaster.1  
This Article begins by exploring conflicts of interest within the 
federal regulatory agency charged with oversight of off-shore drilling, 
the Minerals Management Service (MMS)—conflicts that made it 
virtually impossible for the agency to function rationally to prevent 
the disaster. For example, immediately following the blowout, it was 
abundantly clear that untenable internal conflicts of interest were 
present.2 Broadly speaking, it was necessary to eliminate or reduce 
internal conflicts of interest wherein a single organization handled 
tasks that presented conflicting interests—such as, in the case of the 
former MMS, simultaneous responsibility over the leasing program, 
collection of royalties, and the creation and enforcement of drilling 
and operations regulations.3 Further within the broader subject area 
of agencies, this Article will briefly touch on inadequacies in agency 
funding that led to insufficient inspections, as well as the agency’s 
disproportionate focus on revenue generation that likely led it astray 
from safety concerns. The Article will also explore these issues on a 
state level. 
The second set of lessons this essay addresses concerns the 
unnecessary risks that arise in the face of known research inadequacies 
or insufficient follow-through on known risks. In the Gulf, for 
example, information was readily available to indicate a potentially 
dangerous pressure problem in the well, yet no one stopped the 
relentless forward march toward production to determine the root 
causes of the anomalous pressure “kicks” before it was too late.4 In 
addition, rapidly evolving technologies enabled drillers to reach deeper 
 
1. This Article will not address the many engineering lessons that figured 
prominently in the many post-disaster analyses of the blowout. Those 
lessons are creditably detailed in the numerous government reports on 
the incident. See, e.g., Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 
Regulation & Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Report 
Regarding the Causes of the April 20, 2010 Macondo Well 
Blowout (2011) [hereinafter Joint Investigative Report]; Nat’l 
Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore 
Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future 
of Offshore Drilling, Report to the President (2011) 
[hereinafter Deep Water]. 
2. Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., R41485, Reorganization 
of the Minerals Management Service in the Aftermath of the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 1−2 (2010) (finding that three missions 
of the MMS, energy development, enforcement, and revenue collection, 
created internal conflicts of interest); see also, Mark Jaffe & David 
Olinger, “A Troubled Agency in Every Administration,” Denver Post, 
June 6, 2010, at 1A. 
3. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 68. 
4. Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 5. 
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and deeper into the earth beneath the water, though there was not, in 
hindsight, sufficient understanding of the risks this presented in the 
given environmental circumstances.  
Finally, in the third lesson, this Article addresses emergency 
preparedness. For example, despite some emergency response planning, 
there was insufficient research completed regarding how a major 
disaster cleanup plan would work in the environmental conditions 
present in the Gulf. There had been little attention paid to planning for 
worst-case scenarios. Although there appeared to be a serious safety 
culture on the rig, safety drills did not account for improbable but 
perilous circumstances and worst-case scenarios, such as total darkness 
and lack of reliable communication channels. Little was understood 
about the resources available in the area, the training of those local 
resources, or how certain cleanup technologies, like booms and 
dispersants, would function in the Gulf. The Article addresses the 
retrospectively apparent lack of clarity within and among the chains of 
command, and the insufficiency of resources to implement even the 
inadequate cleanup contingencies that were in place. As Ohio moves 
quickly towards the development of its shale oil and gas industry, it 
must learn from these lessons so that when disaster strikes, Ohio is 
clear on the answers to some important questions: What are the 
necessary safety protocols for a given emergency? Who is responsible 
for that emergency? And who is properly trained and prepared to 
manage that emergency? 
These three lessons from the Gulf may inform Ohio and other 
states, and perhaps eventually the federal government, which will, 
either individually or collectively, be responsible for safely developing 
abundant resources in shale oil and gas. In Forbes Magazine, George 
P. Mitchell, who is widely credited with pioneering the use of 
hydraulic fracturing to break natural gas free from seemingly 
impermeable shale, suggested that hydraulic fracturing needs to be 
regulated by the Department of Energy, not just by individual states.5 
His rationale was that “if they don’t do it right[,] there could be 
trouble . . . . There’s no excuse not to get it right.”6 To date, the bulk 
of regulation applicable to hydraulic fracturing of shale comes from 
 
5. Christopher Helman, Billionaire Father of Fracking Says Government 
Must Step Up Regulation, Forbes (July 19, 2012, 8:29 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2012/07/19/billionaire-
father-of-fracking-says-government-must-step-up-regulation; see also 
Thomas L. Friedman, Get It Right On Gas, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2012, 
at SR13 (discussing George Mitchell’s quote in Forbes that the 
Department of Energy should regulate hydraulic fracturing); Edwin 
Dobb, The New Oil Landscape, Nat’l Geographic, Mar. 2013, at 29, 
57 (discussing George Mitchell’s call for “more transparency and tighter 
regulation”). 
6.  Helman, supra note 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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the states, not the federal government. As Mitchell suggested, this 
makes it even more important that the states do it right. As Ohio 
races headlong into the development of its shale oil and gas resources, 
it must be mindful both of this warning and of the vital lessons 
learned from the Gulf disaster.  
The blowout in the Gulf presents countless lessons, many not 
directly applicable to the regulation of hydraulic fracturing in Ohio. 
The lessons are far too numerous to recount here, and several 
government reports have analyzed them over thousands of detailed 
pages in numerous studies.7 This Article focuses on only three 
immediate lessons that might help Ohio and other states as they 
endeavor both to encourage and to regulate the burgeoning shale oil 
and gas industry. In particular, the three lessons concern agency 
internal conflicts of interest, issues of research investigation and 
follow- through, and emergency planning and preparedness. 
I. Internal Conflict of Interest Within an Agency 
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) authorizes the 
Secretary of the Department of the Interior to handle the regulation 
of resource development in the Outer Continental Shelf—in 
particular, the oil located deep beneath the Gulf of Mexico.8 The 
OCSLA dictates that the Secretary’s regulatory authority includes the 
regulation of leasing, exploration, development, and production of 
resources in the covered area—including the Gulf of Mexico.9 Prior to 
the 2010 disaster, the Secretary of the Interior delegated that 
regulatory responsibility to the Department of the Interior’s MMS.10 
As such, MMS bore responsibility for regulating drilling, and it set 
forth the applicable regulations in 30 C.F.R. part 250. In particular, 
subpart 250 regulates most imaginable aspects of drilling operations, 
 
7. See, e.g., Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1; Comm. for 
Analysis of Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Fire, 
& Oil Spill to Identify Measures to Prevent Similar Accidents 
to the Future, Nat’l Acad. of Eng’g, & Nat’l Research 
Council, Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons 
for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety (2011) [hereinafter 
National Academy Report]; Deepwater Horizon Study Grp., 
Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well 
Blowout (2011).  
8. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a (2006). 
9.  43 U.S.C. § 1334. 
10.  30 C.F.R. § 250.101 (2011). After the disaster, MMS was reorganized 
and the responsibility for these regulations was delegated to the Bureau 
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.101 
(2012); Hogue, supra note 2, at 4. 
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and MMS was responsible for promulgation and implementation of 
the regulations.11 
The United States Coast Guard is, and was at the time of the 
disaster, responsible for regulating the “safety of life and property on 
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) facilities, vessels, and other units 
engaged in OCS activities.”12 Drilling rigs and even some production 
platforms fall under the regulatory definition of “vessels.” The Coast 
Guard, therefore, was partially responsible for regulating their safe 
operation and was fully responsible for certifying their seaworthiness.13 
Prior to the blowout, the most recent update to the Coast Guard’s 
marine-safety rules had been in 1982.14 The Coast Guard proposed 
new safety rules in 1999, triggering substantial industry opposition, 
and has not yet made those rules final.15 Furthermore, budgetary 
constraints and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, shifted 
the Coast Guard’s focus to border and port security, such that it 
apparently passed on much of its responsibility for fixed-platform 
safety to the MMS in 2002.16 
While the EPA has some independent regulatory authority over 
oil and gas operations—for example, water and air pollution related 
issues—there are also a significant number of exemptions that make 
identifying the EPA’s specific authority over these operations 
confusing. For example, the EPA is the lead federal response agency 
for oil spills occurring in inland waters, whereas the Coast Guard is 
the lead federal agency responsible for spills in coastal waters and 
deepwater ports.17 So, although the Coast Guard and EPA had some 
regulatory responsibilities, primary responsibility for regulating 
drilling operations lay with MMS, which controlled the promulgation 
 
11.  See 30 C.F.R. § 250.500 (2011) (discussing the proper manner of 
conducting oil and gas well-completion operations in relation to 
protecting life, property, natural resources, national security, or the 
environment); 30 C.F.R. § 250.101 (2011) (delegating authority to MMS 
to regulate aspects such as equipment movement, emergency shutdowns, 
crew instructions, and reporting). 
12. 33 C.F.R. § 140.1 (2012). 
13. 46 C.F.R. § 2.01-1 (2012); see also, e.g., 46 CFR § 90.05-.35 (including 
“oil-rig-drilling-vessels” in definition of “miscellaneous vessels”). 
14. Curry L. Hagerty & Jonathan L. Ramseur, Cong. Research 
Serv., R41262, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Selected Issues 
for Congress 37 (2010). 
15. Outer Continental Shelf Activities, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,416 (proposed Dec. 
7, 1999) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 140–147). 
16. Inspection Under, and Enforcement of, Coast Guard Regulations for 
Fixed Facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf by the Minerals 
Management Service, 67 Fed. Reg. 5912 (Feb. 7, 2002) (to be codified at 
33 C.F.R. pt. 140). 
17. Oil Spills, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oilspill (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
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and enforcement of applicable construction, operation, and safety 
regulations.18 Thus, MMS was writing and enforcing the regulations it 
created.  
In addition to regulating, MMS handled the leasing, for oil 
exploration and production, of deepwater locations under federal 
control.19 Once locations were leased, MMS managed the permitting of 
exploration wells and the production wells that followed, and it also 
handled the revenue collection associated with the producing wells on 
leased land. So, MMS was handling leasing, regulation, and revenue 
collection. 
This internally conflicting system was created by design. When 
then–Secretary of the Interior James Watt created MMS in 1982, he 
argued that MMS should “promote domestic energy supplies by 
dramatically expanding drilling on the outer continental shelf.”20 He 
thought that to promote production most efficiently, it would be best 
to combine, within a single agency, the multiple functions that 
ultimately festered into fatally problematic internal conflicts of 
interest: leasing, regulatory oversight, responsibility for collection of 
revenues from leases, and royalties from producing wells.21 Hence, the 
agency was purposefully fashioned with a fully incorporated strain 
between environmental protection and safety and the marketing and 
execution of offshore oil and gas production.22 This tension is well 
documented and explained in the government’s Deep Water report, 
which traces the history of leasing, the history of the rise of efforts 
towards environmental protection, and the original and growing 
conflict between them.23 
Soon after the April 22, 2010, blowout of the Macondo well, then–
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar announced his intent to “strip 
MMS’s safety and environmental enforcement responsibilities away 
from its leasing, revenue collection, and permitting functions.”24 The 
reason for this dismantling of the federal agency that had long 
handled all of these functions was the debilitating conflict of interest 
that became obvious in the aftermath of the disaster. The three 
ultimately conflicting missions of the agency were, as articulated by 
the Department immediately following the spill: OCS resource 
management (leasing), safety and environmental regulation and 
 
18. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 68. 
19. Hogue, supra note 2, at 2.  
20. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 56 (emphasis added). 
21.  Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 60. 
24. Id. at 55. 
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enforcement (enforcement), and revenue collection.25  
Leasing, enforcement, and revenue collection were conflicting 
interests because the agency, which was working to bring more 
revenue into U.S. government coffers, would not have the incentive to 
make sound leasing or enforcement decisions that might be in conflict 
with its revenue-raising goals. Following the disaster, what had once 
been one agency with internally conflicting functions would become 
three separate entities: the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Office of 
Natural Resources Revenue.26 No longer would the fox (the agency 
that collected fees and royalties from oil and gas producers) live right 
within the hen house (the agency that granted drilling leases and 
permits, and wrote and enforced safety and environmental 
regulations). Still, although this division of MMS functions was an 
improvement, the President’s Commission found it insufficient, and 
recommended the creation of an entirely “independent agency within 
the Department of the Interior with enforcement authority to oversee 
all aspects of offshore drilling safety (operational and occupational).”27 
This Part illustrates the former-MMS’s internal conflicts of 
interest by examining MMS’s key functions in leasing, regulatory 
oversight, and the collection of revenues and royalties from leases and 
productive wells. It then explores the regulatory structure in Ohio to 
determine whether Ohio’s structure presents the same, or similarly 
problematic, regulatory concerns as were present in the Gulf. 
A. Leasing 
This Section briefly describes the federal leasing system through 
which the U.S. government facilitated oil exploration in the Gulf of 
Mexico. It then compares the system in Ohio with respect to leasing 
of land for exploration and development of shale resources. 
1. Leasing of Drilling Rights in Federal Waters  
In 1954, President Eisenhower’s Department of the Interior granted 
the first lease for exploratory offshore drilling operations in the United 
States.28 Others soon followed.29 The 1954 lease produced about $116 
 
25. Hogue, supra note 2, at 2−3. 
26. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 55 (citing Press Release, Dep’t of the 
Interior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting Missions (May 19, 
2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divi 
des-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-Missions.cfm). 
27. Id. at 256. For the President’s Commission’s recommendations on this 
point, see id. at 257–59. 
28.  Tyler Priest, Auctioning the Ocean: The Creation of the Federal Offshore 
Leasing Program, 1954-1962, in 1 Papers on the Evolving Offshore 
Industry, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in 
Southern Louisiana 93, 97 (Minerals Mgmt. Serv., 2008). 
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million in bonuses for the Federal Treasury, and these early leases 
quickly yielded $129.5 million in revenue, which were swiftly followed 
by another set of leases yielding an additional $23 million.30 Clearly, 
this was to become a promising source of federal revenue. But as the 
push for increased U.S. energy development continued, urged on by the 
oil embargo of 1973, environmentalists hoped that increased 
development would not come at the cost of the environment.31 Still, the 
new federal laws specifically enacted to facilitate increased U.S. oil 
production exhibited this now-common tension between encouraging 
production and protecting safety and the environment. The laws 
included some stringent environmental protections and also plenty of 
room in the decision-making processes for differing viewpoints. In 
contrast, knowing that the enactment and judicial enforcement of the 
National Environmental Policy Act had led to some successful 
challenges to leases,32 those who wanted fast and efficient enabling of 
U.S. oil and gas production pushed to enact federal laws in which a 
quest for environmental protection would not subdue oil and gas 
production. 
By 1978, Congress was busily enacting legislation to transform the 
leasing process. To do this, it passed the OCSLA Amendments, which 
included a new leasing process, essentially the process in effect 
today.33 That act, like many other federal laws, included built-in 
tensions between environmental protection and safety, and revenue 
generation and productivity.34 
The amendments set forth a plan for the development of a five-
year program for leasing.35 This plan included preparation for the 
leasing of specific sites, requirements for exploration plan approvals, 
 
29. Id. at 97–98; Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
Leasing Oil and Natural Gas Resources: Outer Continental 
Shelf 49–50 (2006). 
30. Priest, supra note 28, at 97–98; see also Leasing Oil and Natural 
Gas Resources, supra note 29, at 49. 
31. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 58–60 (discussing the development 
of heightened awareness towards environmental issues surrounding 
offshore drilling). 
32. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836–37 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (denying the Secretary of the Interior’s motion for 
summary reversal because the proposed leases failed to include a 
presentation of the environmental risks posed by the leases, as required 
by the National Environmental Protection Act). 
33.  Compare Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 
Stat. 629 (1978), with Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331–1356a (2006). 
34. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 60 (citing Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629). 
35.  43 U.S.C. § 1344. 
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and approvals for development and production plans.36 While the 
revised statute spoke to environmental standards as relevant to the 
secretary’s permitting decisions, it left substantial space for the 
Secretary to make decisions on other grounds.37 For example, the 
statute requires the Secretary of the Interior to “obtain a proper 
balance between the potential for environmental damage, the 
potential for discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse 
impact on the coastal zone.”38 It also requires the Secretary to study 
the “environmental impacts on the human, marine, and coastal 
environments” of activities on the outer continental shelf.39 It requires 
the Secretary of Homeland Security (because the Coast Guard 
operates under the Department of Homeland Security) to promulgate 
safety regulations using “the best available and safest technologies 
which the Secretary determines to be economically feasible, wherever 
failure of equipment would have a significant effect on safety, health, 
or the environment.”40  
The problems with these seemingly protective pronouncements, of 
course, are their internal flexibility—“adverse effect” is highly 
interpretable, as is “economically feasible.” In addition, the statute 
provides an even more explicit escape clause, stating that the 
Secretary need not follow the safety requirements “where the 
Secretary determines that the incremental benefits are clearly 
insufficient to justify the incremental costs of utilizing such 
technologies.”41 This gives the Secretary substantial wiggle room in 
wrestling with the already built-in tensions between environmental 
and safety precautions on the one hand, and oil and gas productivity 
and revenue generation on the other. This basic tension, accompanied 
by flexibility in regulation and ever-present incentives to promote 
production and raise revenue, places the Secretary in a difficult spot. 
Although the Secretary is supposed to balance environmental 
protection and safety with production and revenue, it is easy to see 
how the best laid plans might be derailed. 
The statute that governs leasing also appears to prefer 
productivity to safety and environmental protection by including an 
exception for development and production of Gulf of Mexico leases 
from the basic requirement that applications for production and 
 
36. Id.; see also Deep Water, supra note 1, at 61 (depicting graphically 
the Outer Continental Shelf leasing and development process over a 
five-year program). 
37. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 62. 
38. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3). 
39. 43 U.S.C. § 1346(a). 
40. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 
41. Id. 
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development be based on, and consistent with, the potential lessee’s 
submitted and approved “development and production plan.”42 This 
exception is critically important because it is within those 
development and production plans that the law requires lessees to set 
forth “the environmental safeguards to be implemented.”43 
Additionally, a NEPA environmental review requirement would be 
triggered based on the Secretary’s review of a lessee’s development 
and production plan because the statute specifically states that this 
must happen.44 The Secretary must declare the approval of a 
development and production plan in a given area, at least once, to be 
a major federal action, which would, of course, trigger environmental 
review under NEPA.45 If the lessee is exempted from submitting a 
development and production plan, there is no plan available that 
might be declared a major federal action, and therefore, no required 
environmental review under NEPA.46 According to the President’s 
Commission, these exemptions and exceptions grew out of some major 
horse trading and compromise, which is of course not unusual in the 
creation of legislation.47 Over the next decades, congressional action 
and court decisions led to an even stronger preference for drilling in 
the Gulf over other regions of the country.48 
The regulation of offshore drilling has always been embroiled in 
politics, early horse trading notwithstanding. Political pressures have 
remained intertwined with oil and gas development as the industry 
matured, not least when MMS was created under President Reagan’s 
administration through Secretary of the Interior James Watt. Watt 
focused on speeding up the leasing process and vowed to make a 
 
42. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1). As noted in the President’s Report, the 
exception applies to production and development leases, not to those for 
exploration. Exploration plans are required of all lessees before they 
begin exploratory drilling. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 62 (citing 
43 U.S.C. § 1340). 
43. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(3). 
44.  43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 
45.  Id. 
46. These provisions are further complicated by the language that allows 
the Secretary to reinstate the development and production plan 
requirements for certain portions of the Gulf of Mexico—the eastern 
portion abutting Florida—but leaving the central and western Gulf 
outside the plan and review requirements. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(l); see also 
Deep Water, supra note 1, at 62. 
47. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 62–63 (noting that “the Act 
reflected a carefully calibrated political compromise”). 
48. Id. at 66–67 (“What began as a policy allowing offshore drilling in the 
Gulf under a more relaxed regulatory regime than applied elsewhere 
gradually became a policy of allowing offshore drilling, as a practical 
matter, almost only in the Gulf.”). 
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billion acres of the outer continental shelf readily available.49 He 
famously declared at a press conference, “We will offer one billion 
acres for leasing in the next five years. We will not back away from 
our plans to have 42 lease sales.”50 MMS was born into this 
atmosphere of intense focus on the increase of production and the 
revenue increases that accompany it, and its handling of leases in 
federally controlled waters was no exception. 
2. Leasing in Ohio 
With respect to drilling in the Gulf, MMS, a federal agency, 
handled the leasing of drilling rights to federally controlled underwater 
lands.51 The relevant statutes encouraged that agency to lease land and 
to use those leases strategically and enthusiastically to boost U.S. oil 
and gas production and bring in revenue to the U.S. Treasury and 
economy. The laws were written such that leases in the Gulf were not 
subject to certain requirements that would have slowed down the 
leasing and production processes and therefore the revenue stream.52  
Ohio, on the contrary, has a relatively small amount of federally 
controlled land to lease for oil and gas development. It has the Wayne 
National Forest53 in southeastern Ohio, and a single, small national 
park, Cuyahoga Valley National Park.54 Administration of oil and 
natural gas activities in the Wayne National Forest is administered by 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service, under the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 197655 and the Wayne 
National Forest Land and Resources Management Plan (Forest 
Plan).56 The Wayne National Forest land includes a mix of federally 
owned mineral rights (41 percent—493 active wells) and privately 
owned mineral rights (59 percent—790 active wells).57 According to 
the Forest Service, as of June 2012, the Wayne National Forest has 
 
49. Id. at 63. 
50. Id. 
51. 30 C.F.R. § 250.101 (2011); see also Hogue, supra note 2, at 5. 
52.  43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1). 
53. Wayne Nat’l Forest, http://www.fs.usda.gov/wayne (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2013). 
54. Cuyahoga Valley Nat’l Park, www.nps.gov/cuva/index.htm (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2013).  
55. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-579, 
90 Stat. 2743. 
56. Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Final Revised Land and 
Resource Management Plan, Wayne National Forest (2006). 
57. Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Administration of Oil and Natural 
Gas Activities, Wayne Nat’l Forest, http://www.fs.usda.gov/ 
detail/wayne/home/?cid=stelprdb5376502 (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
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1,283 active vertical wells—in the federally and privately owned 
minerals categories combined.58 
As of June 6, 2012, there was no Utica or Marcellus shale drilling 
occurring and none proposed for the Wayne National Forest.59 Still, 
the federally owned land in the Wayne National Forest is available for 
lease, by nomination, or expression of interest to the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM).60 Nominations could be made for Utica or 
Marcellus shale development in the same way they are made for any 
other type of oil and gas development on federal land.61 If a 
nomination or expression of interest was made, the BLM would then 
evaluate the requested land for availability.62 To evaluate land for 
availability, the BLM assesses the property rights (land and mineral) 
to the land, checks for restrictions on its use, and determines its 
availability for lease.63 It prepares a competitive bid package and 
posts a public notice that the land will be made available for lease.64 
After a lessee is selected, the lessee must engage in a process of 
planning, evaluation, environmental review, and public involvement 
during the course of development.65 
The federal government owns more than 90 percent of the land in 
the Cuyahoga Valley National Park, and unlike the Wayne National 
Forest, National Park lands, with few exceptions, are not available for 
mineral lease. That said, the Cuyahoga Valley National Park includes 
some privately owned land within its boundaries as well as some land 
for which the park owns the surface rights but not the mineral rights. 
In those instances, a potential mineral developer would have to cross 
park land to develop mineral rights, and would have to comply with 
park rules and regulations regarding that process. In particular, they 
would have to “submit a plan of operation, listing all of the details 
and the potential impacts of hydraulic fracturing and the specific 
 
58.  Id. 
59. Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Frequently Asked Questions on Oil 
and Gas Management, Wayne Nat’l Forest, http://www.fs.usda.gov 
/detail/wayne/home/?cid=stelprdb5376538 (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
60. Id.  
61. Id. 
62. Federal Oil and Gas Leasing and Development in the Eastern States, 
Bureau of Land Mgm’t, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, http://www.blm.gov 
/es/st/en/prog/minerals/about_minerals.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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chemicals used.”66 According to Park biologist Meg Plona, “there 
would have to be an environmental assessment, and the plan would 
have to be approved by the National Park Service.”67 
Significantly, and in contrast to the land and mineral leasing 
systems run by the federal government on federal land in Ohio, most 
Ohio drilling is done on private land, state-owned land, or lands 
owned by local government entities.68 The vast majority of lands 
being leased for drilling and exploration, therefore, are not leased by 
any agency, state or federal. Unlike the situation in the Gulf, 
landowners are not negotiating with an agency for their leases. 
Instead, the drilling companies negotiate leases and rights to drill 
directly with landowners through brokers called “landmen.”69 
The Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) provides 
some limited advice for landowners to assist them when entering into 
leases for drilling on their land.70 But, other than imposing 
requirements regarding issues such as drilling unit size and 
notification of neighbors, the Ohio agency does not control leasing.71 
There are many problems surrounding the leasing of land for shale oil 
and gas development in Ohio. Eastern Ohio landowners are being 
approached by landmen to arrange for leasing the mineral rights to 
their land. The landowners may be uninformed about the true value 
of the resources under their land, unrepresented with respect to their 
financial interests and legal rights, out resourced, outmaneuvered, and 
taken advantage of. But unlike the circumstances of conflicting 
internal authority that was evident in the Gulf, in Ohio, the agency 
with primary control of shale oil and gas development, the ODNR, 
 
66. John Funk, Shale Gas: Drilling Down, Cuyahoga Valley Landowners Get 
Offers to Lease, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Mar. 15, 2012, at A1 (quoting 
Meg Plona, a biologist with the Park’s resource management division). 
67. Id. (quoting Meg Plona). 
68. Div. of Oil & Gas Res. Mgmt., Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., Ohio 
Oil and Gas Summary 1 (2011) [hereinafter McCormac Report]. 
69. See, e.g., About Us, N. Appalachian Landman’s Ass’n, http://www. 
nalalandman.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (“Landmen link 
landowners with the companies and people who want to pay them for 
rights to energy and minerals on their properties.”). 
70. General Information of Leasing for Oil and Gas in Ohio, Ohio Dep’t 
of Natural Res., http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/mineral/landowner/tabid/1 
7732/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2013); see also Ohio Dep’t of 
Natural Res., Oil & Gas Leasing in Ohio, available at http:// 
ohiodnr.com/Portals/11/Pdf/leasing-fact-sheet2.pdf. 
71. Frequently Asked Questions about Leasing for Oil and Gas in Ohio, 
Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., http://oilandgas.ohiodnr.gov/Citizens 
/Leasing-Information.aspx/#tabname3 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) 
(“The Division of Oil & Gas Resources Management does not get involved 
in contractual differences between the landowner and the producer.”). 
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does not have responsibility over leasing decisions. Because the 
ODNR does not control leasing, it also collects no revenue from leases 
and thus does not face the conflicts of interest that existed within 
MMS. 
B. Revenue Generation  
This Section explores MMS’s role in revenue generation with 
respect to the oil production taking place in the Gulf and shows that 
MMS’s revenue-collecting role helped create an untenable internal 
conflict of interest within that agency. It then describes and compares 
the role of Ohio agencies in terms of revenue generation from the 
development of shale oil and gas to determine whether the Ohio 
regulatory scheme presents a similar problem. 
1. Revenue Generation by the Federal Agency 
Prior to the birth of MMS, the Department of the Interior’s BLM 
had collected revenues for natural resources leases on federal land.72 
But after finding problems with BLM’s collection efforts, then–
Secretary Watt incorporated that revenue-collection function within 
the new agency, MMS.73 After this incorporation, MMS was carrying 
out two major, potentially conflicting, functions with regard to 
offshore drilling—regulatory oversight and revenue collection. MMS’s 
revenue-generating functions came through its collection of upfront 
payments for leases and royalties on productive wells.74 MMS received 
some direct congressional appropriations,75 and in addition, MMS 
obtained revenue from some outer congressionally authorized 
continental shelf rental receipts, inspection fees for OCS facilities, and 
cost recovery fees. In fact, the agency took in an average of $13 billion 
in minerals revenue.76 Prior to its reorganization, MMS had collected 
over $210 billion in revenues from its management of oil and gas, 
metals, and other programs.77 Between 2005 and 2007, it “completed 
 
72. H.R. Rep. No. 97-942, at 40 (1983). 
73. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 64. 
74. Act of Dec. 30, 1982, Pub L. No. 97-394, 96 Stat. 1966, 1973 
(appropriating $196,506,000 to MMS for leasing and royalty 
management). 
75. Id. 
76. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Office of the Sec’y, Salazar 
Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting Missions (May 19, 2010), http://www. 
doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-Mi 
ssions.cfm. 
77. Id.; see also Reorganization of Title 30: Bureaus of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement and Ocean Energy Management, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 64,432 (Oct. 18, 2011).  
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1,080 audits of energy firm royalty payments.”78 “Between August 
1990 and January 2008, MMS initiated 623 civil penalty reviews that 
resulted in 498 civil penalties for which the agency collected 
$18,591,792 in fines.79 
The program also generated U.S. Treasury revenues by receiving 
oil and gas royalties in kind (in the form of product), rather than in 
cash, and competitively selling the commodities in the marketplace. 
The MMS retained a portion of the revenues generated through 
royalty-in-kind operations to cover related administrative expenses. 
During Fiscal Year 2007, royalty-in-kind operations generated an 
additional $63 million in benefits for the U.S. Treasury. So, like the 
parties it was overseeing, MMS was selling oil in the marketplace. 
This effort was effective. Since its inception in 1982, MMS had 
disbursed approximately $200 billion to federal, state and American 
Indian accounts.80 
To bring in continually greater revenues, of course, the oil and gas 
industry needed to move drilling operations further offshore to more 
productive fields, and MMS needed to facilitate this result in order to 
continue generating abundant revenues.81 To facilitate revenue 
generation from the same entities for which one is responsible for 
oversight certainly breeds conflicting interest. So, at the same time 
that MMS was raking in cash for the federal treasury, it was also 
controlling the leasing of offshore drilling sites, promulgating the rules 
that governed those offshore drilling, and handling the inspections of 
drilling operations.  
2. Revenue Generation in Ohio 
In Ohio, the big topic of conversation concerning oil and gas 
revenues focuses on severance taxes. Ohio severance taxes—those 
levied when Ohio’s natural resources are separated, or severed, from 
Ohio—are collected by the Ohio Tax Commissioner.82 The 
Commissioner’s office is mainly, though not completely, unrelated to 
 
78. Miles Moffeit, Minerals Division Workers Punished, Denver Post, 
Nov. 23, 2008, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_11047268. Further, 
from 2001 to 2006 “MMS’s minerals revenue program accounted for . . . 
$36 billion.” Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, MMS 
Moves to Strengthen Compliance Effort (Dec. 6, 2006). 
79. Press Release, supra note 76.  
80.  Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Budget Justifica-
tions and Performance Information Fiscal Year 2010, at 11 (2010). 
81. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 56 (discussing the consequences of 
increasing revenue by drilling further offshore). 
82. Tax Analysis Div. & The Commc’ns Office, Ohio Department 
of Taxation 2011 Annual Report 10, 13 (2011) (collection overseen 
by the Excise, Motor Fuel and Public Utilities Tax division). 
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the regulatory workings of the ODNR.83 And ODNR’s Division of Oil 
and Gas is not completely free from collecting and handling revenue, 
as it has statutory authority to collect fees based on oil and gas 
development and operation.84 Although most of the Ohio Revised 
Code sections allow for the collection of fees for permits or 
inspections, the cost recovery assessment in section 1509.50 is tied to 
the Ohio severance taxes assessed via Ohio Revised Code sections 
5749.06 and 5749.02.85 Although the statute calls for this “assessment” 
to be “treated the same and equivalent for all purposes as the taxes 
levied on the severance of oil and gas,” the statute concludes that 
“the assessment imposed by this section is not a tax.”86 According to 
the statute, money received through these sections will be paid to the 
newly created oil and gas well fund.87 The fund also receives income 
from civil penalties and severances taxes.88 Money in the fund is to be 
used for the Division’s expenses associated with administering Revised 
Code Chapters 1509 and 1571 (dealing with underground storage of 
gas), and for other expenses that are critical and necessary for the 
protection of human health and safety and the environment related to 
oil and gas production.89 So, the statute indicates that although the 
Division must use its revenues to sustain itself in carrying out its 
assigned duties, “expenses of the division in excess of the moneys 
 
83. See id. at 13 (showing that the Commissioner’s office oversees severance 
and natural gas distribution taxes). 
84. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.02 (West 2012) (creating an oil and 
gas well fund). Various sections of the Ohio Revised Code also allow the 
Division of Oil and Natural Gas to collect funds. See id. § 1509.06(G) 
(permit fees); id. § 1509.061 (request to revise existing tract); id. 
§ 1509.062(E) (temporary inactive well status); id. § 1509.13(D) (permit 
to abandon); id. § 1509.22(D) (storage or disposal of brine); id. 
§ 1509.222(A)(2) (registration certificate and identification number for 
transportation of brine); id. § 1509.34 (priority liens); id. § 1509.50 (oil 
and gas regulatory cost recovery assessment). 
85. Id. § 1509.50(A) (“An owner shall pay the assessment in the same 
manner as a severer who is required to file a return under section 
5749.06 of the Revised Code. . . . Except for an exempt domestic well, 
the assessment imposed shall be in addition to the taxes levied on the 
severance of oil and gas under section 5749.02 of the Revised Code.”). 
86. Id. § 1509.50(D). 
87. Id. § 1509.02 (“All moneys collected by the chief pursuant to sections 
1509.06, 1509.061, 1509.062, 1509.071, 1509.13, 1509.22, 1509.221, 
1509.222, 1509.34, and 1509.50 . . . shall be deposited into the state 
treasury to the credit of the oil and gas well fund, which is hereby 
created.”).  
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
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available in the fund shall be paid from general revenue fund 
appropriations to the department.”90 
It is this last section that is troubling, especially in light of the 
issues that occurred in the Gulf. ODNR’s Division of Oil and Gas is, 
to a not insubstantial extent, collecting funds to sustain itself, and 
this allows a potentially dangerous conflict of interest to persist 
within the agency, as it did in the MMS.  
As mentioned above, Ohio has been focused on the issue of 
severance tax revenues generated through oil and gas development. 
On June 11, 2012, Ohio Governor John Kasich signed Amended H.B. 
487 into law.91 The new law initially proposed to impose higher 
severance taxes on horizontal wells than were previously imposed.92 
However, this section was removed from the bill before H.B 487 was 
signed into law. The bill earmarked an incremental portion of the 
severance taxes on horizontal wells for personal income tax relief. 
Because the incremental tax benefit was tied to the price of natural 
gas, which can swing substantially, it is unknown what level of impact 
this tax would have had on personal income taxes in Ohio. Ohio 
Governor John Kasich attempted to add this section into law through 
a different bill, H.B. 59, but this effort to achieve higher severance 
taxes also failed. There has been some indication that there are new 
efforts to impose a statewide severance tax, but no further official 
action has occurred.93 
The issue has been controversial, mainly because of the plan to 
spend the severance tax revenue on general income tax reductions 
rather than anything specifically related to environmental protection, 
shale development, or marketing of shale development, or, really, 
anything related to the resources themselves. Still, regardless how the 
money would have been spent, what matters here is how the tax is 
ultimately determined and collected.  
 
90. Id. 
91. Press Release, Ohio Governor John R. Kasich, Kasich Signs Three Bills 
into Law (June 11, 2012), http://www.governor.ohio.gov/Portals/0/pdf 
/news/06%2011%2012%20Kasich%20Signs%20Main%20MBR%20Energy
%20and%20Gaming%20Bill.pdf.  
92. Ernst & Young LLP, Analysis of Ohio Severance Tax Provisions 
of H.B. 487, at 1 (2012). 
93. Brent Larkin, There’s No Logical Argument Against Kasich’s Proposed 
Fracking Tax, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Mar. 31, 2013, http://www. 
cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/03/theres_no_logical_argument_ag
a.html; see also Jim Siegel & Joe Vardon, Kasich’s Tax Proposals, 
Medicaid Expansion Out in House GOP Plan, Columbus Dispatch, 
Apr. 19, 2013, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/ 
04/09/Ohio-GOP-kills-Kasichs-tax-plan.html. 
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The new law would have increased Ohio’s severance tax from 
0.5% (or 0.8% depending on the type of well) to 2.7%.94 Still, even 
with the increased rate, according to the accounting firm Ernst & 
Young, Ohio’s effective tax rate would be 16% to 40% lower 
(depending on what the well is producing) than other states’ 
severance taxes.95 Currently, Ohio taxes oil at a rate of 20 cents per 
barrel and natural gas at a rate of 3 cents per thousand cubic feet.96 
This total rate includes both a severance tax and a cost recovery 
assessment.97 The new law would have changed the system a bit.98 It 
divides wells into two categories, by type of well: “horizontal wells” 
and “other wells,” which is a catch-all category that includes anything 
that is not horizontal.99 Oil that does not come from a horizontal well 
will still be taxed at the current 20 cent rate.100 The new law would 
have changed the rate for gas from wells in the “other” category. It 
would have been taxed at the lesser of the current rate or 1% of the 
market value.101 This cap would have insured that taxes on gas from 
“other” wells will not be increased. 
Horizontal wells are in another category. The new law would have 
imposed higher taxes on both oil and gas from these wells. It divided 
this category into wet gas and dry gas, with wet gas and oil being 
taxed at 4% of market value, phased in from an initial rate of 1.5% 
for up to two years.102 Dry gas will be taxed at a rate of 1% of market 
value.103 Low-producing wells are exempt from the Ohio severance 
tax.104 
Despite the fact that the increased severance taxes were not 
enacted, the rates are legislated, not determined by the ODNR 
Division of Oil and Gas. Severance taxes are neither determined nor 
collected by the same agency that regulates shale oil and gas 
development, so there appears, at first look, to be no direct or 
internal conflict of interest there. That said, the oil and gas regulatory 
enforcement assessment, the rates for which are tied directly to the 
 
94. Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 92, at 2.  
95.  Id. 
96. Id. at 3.  
97. Id. 
98. Id.  
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
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severance tax system, is collected by the Division for its own 
sustenance. This apparent conflict warrants further study. 
C. Enforcement  
The next lesson from the Gulf that might help improve Ohio’s 
efforts towards the safe and productive development of its shale oil 
resources concerns enforcement (and creation) of safety regulations. 
To support the assertion that the MMS was enforcing regulations 
against the same industry from which it was both generating revenue 
and encouraging production, this Section describes some issues that 
arose in MMS’s exercise of its enforcement responsibilities in the Gulf. 
The premise is that conflicts of interest, in part, led to subpar 
enforcement, which may well have contributed to the events that 
enabled disaster. This Section then examines enforcement efforts in 
Ohio. 
1. Federal Enforcement in the Gulf 
The federal government, through the U.S. Department of the 
Interior, has broad regulatory authority over U.S. natural resources, 
such as the oil beneath the Gulf of Mexico. The federal government 
controls the leasing, exploration, and development of oil and gas on 
the OCS.105 As discussed above, the Secretary of the Interior had 
delegated all of these authorities to MMS at the time of the Gulf 
disaster.106 This means that the federal government also controlled the 
manner in which these activities were carried out and the rules that 
applied to them concerning safety and environmental protection. 
Through MMS, the federal government issued books of regulations 
pertaining to the operations and safety procedures applicable at the 
enormous floating drilling and production terminals. In particular, 
MMS promulgated “hundreds of pages of technical requirements for 
pollution prevention and control, drilling, well-completion operations, 
oil and gas well-workovers (major well maintenance), production 
safety systems, platforms and structures, pipelines, well production, 
and well-control and -production safety training.”107 Under the 
OCSLA, lease and permit holders must maintain their facilities “in 
compliance with occupational safety and health standards” and “free 
 
105. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 67 (“The federal government has 
never lacked the sweeping authority required to control whether, when, 
and how valuable oil and gas resources located on the outer continental 
shelf are leased, explored, or developed.”). 
106. See Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 157 (discussing the 
powers of MMS at the time of the disaster); supra note 10 and 
accompanying text. 
107. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 68 (citing 30 C.F.R. pt. 250 (2010)). 
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from recognized hazards to employees.”108 They must “maintain all 
operations . . . in compliance with regulations intended to protect 
persons, property and the environment.”109 Clearly, something went 
wrong.  
Additionally, under the OCSLA, MMS was required to enforce 
the regulations in 30 C.F.R part 250,110 and therefore the agency 
required annual and periodic inspections, some scheduled and some 
unannounced, to assure compliance.111 Inspections were to cover 
“pollution, drilling, well completion, production, crane, electrical, and 
personal safety.”112 MMS inspections included evaluation of documents 
as well as on-site inspections and even some testing of equipment.113 
Records inspections might include a look at surveys, records of 
blowout preventer tests and inspections, documentation of pressure 
tests, and records of condition of drilling mud.114 Visual inspections of 
the rig might include inspection of drilling fluid handling areas, 
general safety conditions, safety valves, electrical grounding, and 
more.115 Actual testing of equipment in a routine inspection would 
include testing of many specific safety devices and their operability.116 
MMS maintained a checklist for these inspections, called a Potential 
Incident of Non-Compliance (PINC) list, in an effort to achieve some 
consistency of inspections nationwide.117 MMS inspectors can write up 
violations and issue fines for noncompliance.118 At the time of the 
blowout, the Joint Investigative Panel determined there was no PINC 
on the inspectors’ list that would require the inspectors to regularly 
verify that the major inspection requirements had been met during 
the drilling inspections.119 In particular, 30 C.F.R. § 250.446(a) 
requires an operator to conduct a major inspection of its blowout 
preventer components every three to five years.120 Because there was 
 
108. Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 157 (citing 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1348(b)(1) (2006)). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 158. 
111. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 68. 
112. Id. 
113. Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 162.  
114. Id. 
115. Id.  
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 162−63. 
119. Id. at 163. 
120. Id. (citing 30 C.F.R. § 250.446(a) (2012)).  
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no PINC reference on the inspectors’ list for this provision, inspectors 
did not verify that those inspections of the blowout preventer 
components had been completed.121 Perhaps this inspection would 
have helped prevent disaster. 
This example of an area where more comprehensive inspection 
could have been done, and might have been useful, is but one of many 
such circumstances. The Joint Investigative Panel’s report includes 
many more. Suffice to say, inspectors did not seem to cover some of 
the areas, pieces, and parts that might have been helpful in 
preventing the disaster. 
Finally, an additional issue related to agency operations in the 
Gulf, though not, as above, directly related to internal conflicts of 
interest, was the problem of chronic underfunding of the agency. 
Chronic underfunding is important for a number of reasons, not the 
least of which is the impact underfunding has on the ability of an 
agency to carry out its duties. MMS was responsible for promulgating 
the regulations that would render the whole operation safe. In 
particular, as discussed above, an MMS inspection should involve 
document review, on-site inspection of the facility, and equipment 
tests. Among other records-related reviews, MMS inspectors should 
review surveys, records regarding well control drills, and 
documentation of pressures in the blowout preventer. On-site 
inspections should include visual reviews of many different pieces of 
equipment-diverter systems, drilling fluid handling areas, and safety 
valves. Yet during the 1990s, when the MMS faced a dramatic 
increase in the offshore activity it was responsible for overseeing, the 
financial resources available “decreased precipitously.”122 In 1996, just 
as major development in deepwater drilling activities was expanding, 
the MMS’s budget reached its lowest point.123 
Although tasked with inspection and enforcement responsibility, 
MMS was not able to provide enough inspectors in the Gulf to 
conduct even the required rig and well construction inspections. The 
Deepwater Horizon was inspected on three occasions in the months 
immediately preceding the disaster, and the Joint Investigative Panel 
found that those inspections were not deficient.124 But there were a lot 
of rigs and not so many inspectors in the Gulf. It was just not 
possible to keep up a comprehensive inspection program due to 
tightness of agency funding, expansion of the number of rigs that 
needed inspection, and the large numbers of items on the inspection 
 
121. Id. at 163 (“Because no PINC existed for [30 C.F.R. § 250.446(a)], MMS 
inspectors did not regularly verify that the major inspection require-
ments had been met during drilling inspections.”). 
122. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 72. 
123. Id. at 73 fig. 3.3. 
124. Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 164. 
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agendas.125 Furthermore, government and industry leaders pressured 
the MMS to lower or to eliminate enforcement mechanisms, stating 
that they were too burdensome and not conducive to safety.126 
With regard to permit issuance and enforcement, while the oil and 
gas industry works twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 
government workers, such as the MMS regulators, generally only 
worked traditional office hours, requiring “ ‘on-call’ responsibility” to 
be assigned to senior engineers.127 But those engineers were at a major 
disadvantage because they were not permitted to access the permit 
database from off-site locations due to security concerns.128 
Furthermore, even during regular business hours, there was a severe 
lack of engineers to process the permit reviews. This shortage 
ultimately led to permit shopping, where applications were “shopped 
around” by contacting district offices outside the jurisdictional area in 
efforts to find an engineer who would approve it.129 
Further still, with regard to agency leadership and technical 
expertise, MMS personnel suffered from a severe loss of essential 
expertise throughout their ranks. According to a survey done by the 
Secretary of the Interior, “[a]lmost half of the [MMS] inspectors 
surveyed do not believe they have received sufficient training.”130 The 
MMS had no oil and gas inspection certification program, nor did it 
have any exam required for inspector certification.131 Some inspectors 
even noted that they “rel[ied] on industry representatives to explain 
the technology at a facility.”132  
 
125. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 68 (discussing the details of 
inspections and noting that MMS’s “resources did not keep pace with 
industry expansion into deeper waters and industry’s related reliance on 
more demanding technologies”). 
126. See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental 
Shelf—Incident Reporting Requirements, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,640, 19,640 
(Apr. 17, 2006) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) (discussing 
comments made by industry trade organizations and others involved in 
the industry regarding the proposed rule). 
127. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 74. 
128. Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Bd., U.S. Dep’t of 
the Interior, Report to Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar 
6 (2010) (“[O]n-call engineers . . . are not allowed to access the permit 
database from off-site locations.”).  
129. See id. (“[S]ome operators call various district offices to find an engineer 
who will eventually give approval.”). 
130. Id. at 11.  
131. See id.  
132. Id. 
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 In addition to lacking a sufficient number of inspectors,133 the 
Safety Oversight Board strongly criticized MMS’s handling of 
inspections. For example, management promoted single-inspector 
inspections in an effort to increase the total number of inspections, 
even though “most inspectors interviewed said that two-person teams 
would increase efficiencies, eliminate reliance on an operator 
representative for observations on safety tests, improve the 
thoroughness of the inspection, and reduce the ability of operators to 
successfully pressure an inspector not to issue [a citation].”134 These 
interviews revealed an internal concern that the MMS was focused 
more on the quantity rather than the quality of inspections. 
In addition, while engineers in the private sector were realizing 
steadily increasing salaries, salaries for government engineers were 
stuck in the midranges of the federal pay scale.135 Thus, MMS had 
difficulty attracting the experience and expertise needed to oversee 
the increasingly complicated oil and gas drilling activities.136 This lack 
of resources hampered the ability of the MMS to perform its vital 
functions, such as inspections and technological research.137  
2. Enforcement in Ohio 
The Ohio legislature and the Ohio DNR have taken a firm hand 
in the promulgation and enforcement of statutes and regulations 
applicable to oil and gas development in Ohio. Ohio Revised Code 
section 1509.02 creates the Division of Oil and Gas Resources 
(DOGRM) Management within the ODNR, and gives the Division 
“sole and exclusive authority to regulate the permitting, location, and 
 
133. See Enforcement Measures, Bureau of Safety and Envtl. 
Enforcement, http://www.bsee.gov/About-BSEE/BSEE-Regions/Gulf 
-of-Mexico-Region/Enforcement-Measures.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 
2013) (describing how the BSEE inspection program in the Gulf is 
directed by one regional office and five district offices and using fiscal 
year 2009 as an example to show that there were a small number of 
inspectors for a large number of inspections); Deepwater Horizon 
Inspections: MMS Skipped Monthly Inspections on Doomed Rig, Huff 
Post Green (May 25, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2010/05/16/deepwater-horizon-inspect_n_578079.html (“The job 
falls to the 55 inspectors in the Gulf who are supposed to visit the 90 
drilling rigs once per month and the approximately 3,500 oil production 
platforms once per year.”).  
 
134. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 78 (citing Outer Continental Shelf 
Safety Oversight Bd., supra note 128, at 9). 
135. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 79 (citing Outer Continental 
Shelf Safety Oversight Bd., supra note 128, at 11–12). 
136. Id.  
137. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 72–76 (discussing the impact of 
decreasing resources on various aspects of safety regulation). 
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spacing of oil and gas wells and production operations within the 
state.”138 The legislature pointedly indicated its intent to preempt 
local regulation of oil and gas development by specifying that the 
Division’s regulations will constitute “uniform statewide regulation” 
and a “comprehensive plan with respect to all aspects of the locating, 
drilling, well stimulation, completing, and operating of oil and gas 
wells within this state.”139 These provisions seem to target directly the 
Ohio Constitution’s home rule provision, article XVIII, section 3,140 
which allows localities the power of self-government, that is, to 
regulate themselves except when those regulations are in conflict with 
the state’s general laws. The legislature has stated that its regulation 
of oil and gas development is a general law. So, by this statute, the 
Ohio legislature seems to be claiming that local regulation of shale oil 
and gas operations, in any way, would conflict with the general 
laws.141 Whether that is true is an issue for another day. 
Ohio legislation has strengthened the ODNR’s management of oil 
and gas drilling. Effective June 30, 2010, Senate Bill 165, as modified 
by its substitute bill, directed sweeping and comprehensive regulation 
 
138. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.02 (West 2012). 
139. Id. The Ohio legislature has amended this section several times, each 
time altering the language to emphasize its intention to preempt local 
regulation of oil and gas drilling and operations. For example, in 2009 
the language gave the agency “authority to regulate the permitting, 
location, and spacing of oil and gas wells within the state.” See 2004 
Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. L-987 (West). In 2012, the same section said 
“authority to regulate the permitting, location, and spacing of oil and 
gas wells and production operations within the state.” Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 1509.02 (West Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). In 2009, it said, 
“comprehensive plan with respect to all aspects of the locating, drilling, 
and operating of oil and gas wells within this state, including site 
restoration and disposal of wastes from those wells.” 2004 Ohio Legis. 
Serv. Ann. L-987 (West). And in 2012, the language was changed to say 
“comprehensive plan with respect to all aspects of the locating, drilling, 
well stimulation, completing, and operating of oil and gas wells within 
this state, including site construction and restoration, permitting related 
to those activities, and the disposal of wastes from those wells.” Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.02 (emphasis added). These changes are 
evidence of the legislature’s consistent efforts to limit control of oil and 
gas production and operations to the ODNR. 
140. See Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 3 (“Municipalities shall have authority 
to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce 
within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar 
regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”). 
141. See Vill. of Struthers v. Sokol, 140 N.E. 519, 519–20 (Ohio 1923) (“In 
determining whether an ordinance is in ‘conflict’ with general laws, the 
test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute 
forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.”). Still, the Ohio legislature was 
clearly attempting to claim preemption of local regulation. Whether that 
was successful is a topic for another paper. 
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of oil and gas exploration and drilling.142 It directed the agency to 
oversee rules on well construction and amended language that affected 
the size, shape, and make-up of parcels that could be leased for 
drilling, and it included requirements for spill control and 
containment plans.143 
Following the legislature’s enactment of Senate Bill 315, the 
ODNR promulgated rules on best management practices. Senate Bill 
315 directed the ODNR to fill in, or refine, areas of regulation not 
addressed, or not addressed sufficiently, through Senate Bill 165. For 
example, Senate Bill 315 included new rules on well pad design, 
certification, and construction; design standards for centralized fresh 
water impoundments; and the development of best management 
practices for pre-drill sampling.144 This sampling enables drillers, and 
thereby landowners, to understand the baseline status of the ground 
water wells in the area where drilling will occur. Results of the pre-
drill sampling must be posted “prior to” drilling, but need not be 
included in initial applications to drill.145 They must be conducted to 
a 300-foot radius in designated urban areas, and a 1,500-foot radius in 
nonurban areas, unless ODNR modifies the requirements, which it 
can. ODNR has “best management practices for pre-drilling water 
sampling” and is developing standards for certified samplers and 
laboratories.146 In another example, Senate Bill 315 directed ODNR to 
 
142. See James Zehringer, Director, Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., 
House Public Utilities Committee Proponent Testimony in 
Support of Substitute Senate Bill 315, at 5 (2012), available at 
https://www.dnr.state.oh.us/Portals/11/oil/pdf/UpdatedSB315HousePr
oponentTestimonyofDirectorZehringer.pdf (“SB 165 of the 128th 
General Assembly was a bipartisan bill that thoroughly overhauled 
Ohio’s oil and gas regulations and created a firm foundation for proper 
oversight of the oil and gas industry in Ohio. However, there are certain 
aspects of the horizontal drilling process that were not fully or 
adequately addressed. Sub. SB 315 addresses those remaining regulatory 
issues.”). 
143. See S.B. 165, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2010), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText128/128_SB_165_EN_N.pdf 
(unofficial version of the bill amending various sections of the Ohio 
Revised Code).  
144. S.B. 315, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012). 
145. Id.  
146. See Div. of Oil & Gas, Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., Best 
Management Practices for Pre-Drilling Water Sampling (2012). 
The Ohio EPA currently has a lab certification program. See Certified 
Laboratories, Ohio EPA, http://epa.ohio.gov/ddagw/labcert 
.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (click on “How to obtain a Laboratory 
Certification”) (“A certificate of approval to perform drinking water 
analyses is issued by the Ohio EPA, Division of Drinking and Ground 
Waters (DDAGW) to a laboratory achieving a satisfactory evaluation 
based on an on-site survey. . . . To be eligible to obtain an on-site survey, 
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revise its regulations to account for the drilling technologies currently 
being used in Ohio, including horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing. For example, it newly defines “horizontal well” as an oil 
and gas well “in which the wellbore reaches a horizontal or near 
horizontal position . . . and the well is stimulated.”147 
In Ohio, “[i]nspectors investigate citizens’ complaints, enforce and 
oversee well construction and waste disposal activities, and the 
plugging of wells and site restoration.”148 They “are available to act on 
emergencies, such as well or tank fires that are a threat to public 
health or safety.”149 With regard to oil spills, in particular, “[d]ivision 
inspectors respond to reported oil spills and coordinate remediation of 
contaminated streams or ponds with the Ohio EPA and the ODNR 
Division of Wildlife” and “division inspectors often assist firefighters 
by advising them about potential hazards and serving as a liaison 
between the firefighters and the well owner.”150 Ohio also inspects well 
drilling operations. In particular, Division inspectors “witness critical 
phases of well drilling operations to ensure [the safety of citizens] and 
the protection of soil and water resources.”151  
In 2010, ODNR’s Division of Mineral Resource Management 
(DMRM) had twenty-one oil and gas inspectors assigned to five of its 
 
a laboratory must have received an approval letter from the Ohio EPA, 
Division of Environmental Services (DES), Laboratory Certification 
Section, for the current laboratory floor plans, have participated 
acceptably in any required Proficiency Test, and have submitted an 
application for an on-site survey. If the submitted survey application is 
acceptable, an on-site survey will be performed according to the date 
scheduled by the Laboratory Certification Office.”). See generally Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. ch. 3745 (West 2012) (pertaining to laboratory 
certification standards, which include rules for Ohio public drinking water 
systems adopted under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 6109, and rules for 
underground injection well control adopted under section 6111.044). 
147. S.B. 315. 
148. Div. of Oil and Gas Res., Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., Regulatory 
Enforcement, Ohio.gov, http://oilandgas.ohiodnr.gov/complaint (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
149. Id.; see also State Review of Oil and Natural Gas Envtl. 
Regulations, Inc., Ohio Hydraulic Fracturing State Review 28 
(2011), [hereinafter STRONGER] (“Specific positions, including inspectors 
and geologists, were identified as necessary to address complaints, 
including those associated with hydraulic fracturing.”). 
150.  Div. of Mineral Res. Mgmt., Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., Ohio 
Oil and Gas Field Enforcement, available at http://oilandgas.ohiodnr 
.gov/portals/oilgas/pdf/oilgasfieldenforcement.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
151.  Id. Also, “[b]efore a well plugging operation starts, division inspectors 
must approve plugging materials, methods and a plugging plan for each 
well” in non-coal-bearing areas “based upon records of site-specific 
geology and well construction.” Id. 
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seven field offices. The agency has an inspector priority matrix to 
assist it in risk assessment and to help define inspectors’ work 
priorities. The agency has prioritized well construction and hydraulic 
fracturing operations as critical areas on which inspectors must focus. 
Inspectors were responsible for issuing 1,533 permits in 2010, 
including 690 drilling permits, according to the 2011 ODNR Ohio Oil 
and Gas Summary.152 Furthermore, these inspectors were responsible 
for overseeing the plugging of 355 wells, and the drilling of 460 oil and 
gas wells in forty-two of Ohio’s eighty-eight counties.153 In total, the 
ODNR’s inspectors processed over 49,435 production reports for 
2010.154 
Ohio’s Senate Bill 165 provided statutorily for fee increases to 
support new positions within the agency, presumably for additional 
inspectors, and created multiple new funding mechanisms to support 
the agency’s activities.155 Before the implementation of Senate Bill 
165, there were approximately thirty-five full-time equivalent 
positions in the oil and gas program.156 Plan implementation and 
additional funding could double this number.157 Well constructors 
must notify ODNR within twenty-four hours or at “another time 
period agreed to by the chief’s authorized representative” prior to well 
pad construction, and ODNR must conduct a site review prior to 
issuing a permit and prior to well pad construction.158 ODNR sends 
out a weekly notice to the county engineer of each county that 
contains an active well or has proposed drilling activities.159 The 
agency also provides notice to municipal authorities in those areas.160 
Ohio seems to suffer from enforcement problems similar to those 
that befell MMS in the Gulf. A single agency controls permitting, 
inspection, and enforcement, which is not at all unusual in an 
 
152. See McCormac Report, supra note 68, at i (discussing the findings 
on the number of permits issued). 
153. Id. at 1, 2, 10. 
154. Id. at 1. 
155. See S.B. 165, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2010) (amending 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.02 to have all money collected be used 
“for expenses that are critical and necessary for the protection of human 
health and safety and the environment related to oil and gas production 
in this state”). 
156. See STRONGER, supra note 151, at 6 (indicating that one of the 
strengths of Senate Bill 165 is its ability to create funding mechanisms 
to increase full time oil and gas program employees). 
157. Id. 
158. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.06(J) (West 2012). 
159. Id. § 1509.06(B). 
160. Id. 
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administrative state, but, like MMS, the Ohio agency is underfunded 
and therefore suffers from an insufficient number of inspectors. This 
was a problem in the Gulf, and ODNR and the Ohio legislature 
should continue to work to ensure that Ohio is able to carry out 
sufficient high-quality inspections to identify looming problems and 
make corrections before disaster strikes. 
One additional issue regarding the Ohio enforcement process for 
shale oil and gas development is that, under the Ohio rules, the 
Department’s orders to issue, deny or modify a permit to drill a 
horizontal well are not subject to Ohio’s Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).161 This means that they are not subject to public 
comment or to the timeframe requirements required by the Ohio 
APA. This is troubling, and it sets Ohio’s process apart from the 
federal system (and systems in other states), which generally allow for 
more public participation. Assuming that agencies do learn and 
improve through the public participation process, this omission limits 
the ability of the Ohio agency to learn about potential issues and 
areas of concern with respect to its permitted drilling operations. 
D. Conclusion Regarding Conflicts of Interest 
Whereas at the time of the Gulf disaster the MMS controlled 
several activities that presented internal conflicts of interest, Ohio’s 
regulation of oil and gas production does not present this problem, at 
least not to the same extent. Unlike the situation with MMS, Ohio 
does not have a single agency controlling the conflicting functions of 
leasing, enforcement, and revenue collection.  
Whereas MMS controlled leasing of drilling rights in the Gulf, 
ODNR has no control over leasing. Instead, Ohio leases are private 
transactions. No state agency in Ohio is handing out leases. And 
although MMS collected revenue in various forms, ODNR does not 
serve that function. The Ohio system is not without fault, but its 
faults do not vest in the agency an authority that would conflict 
directly with its other responsibilities. Still, ODNR’s system presents 
 
161. See Kathleen Luikart et al., Ohio Legislative Serv. Comm’n, 
Bill Analysis, Sub. S.B. 315, at 12 (discussing the nonapplicability of 
the Administrative Procedure Act); see also Craig Kasper & Mark 
Bonifas, Navigating Ohio’s Shale Oil & Gas Legislation: Utica 
Shale Issues in Law, Practice and Policy (2012). In addition, the 
Ohio Supreme Court recently held that the Ohio Oil and Gas 
Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals of drilling permits issued 
by the ODNR Division of Oil and Gas. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. 
v. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 985 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 2013). Even though the 
Commission has jurisdiction to hear appeals from orders of the chief of 
the Division of Oil and Gas, drilling permits are not considered 
appealable “orders.” Id. at 483; see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.06 
(West Supp. 2012) (divesting the Commission of jurisdiction over 
permitting decisions). 
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some problems regarding revenue collection. In particular, the gas well 
fund, which is statutorily authorized and tied to the severance tax 
rates, helps fund the agency and Ohio’s coffers. This is concerning and 
is worthy of further study. Rather than the agency dismantling seen 
at the federal level, the DMRM has realigned staff into single program 
areas, which makes sense substantively, provided the reorganization 
does not create internal conflicts of interest. In particular, 
[t]he Oil and Gas Program developed a very detailed 
realignment plan, which included a thorough analysis of 
funding, staffing levels, and priority workloads. The realignment 
plan was used as a guideline for the development of SB 165. 
Specific positions, including inspectors and geologists, were 
identified as necessary to address complaints, including those 
associated with hydraulic fracturing. Well construction and 
hydraulic fracturing operations were re-prioritized as critical job 
coverage. SB 165 included increases in certain fee schedules and 
created a number of new funding mechanisms to support 
division activities. The division staffing levels will almost double 
and hiring of staff has been initiated.162  
Thus, the oil and gas program developed its realignment plan, with 
stakeholder input that included an analysis of funding, staffing levels 
and priority workloads.  
More recently, in October 2011, the oil and gas program formerly 
under the ODNR DMRM became a standalone division known as the 
Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management.163 This has effectively 
separated oil and gas regulation from the regulation of the state’s 
other natural resources. If Ohio can keep an eye on the funding 
mechanisms, and keep the inspection function independent of revenue 
collection, Ohio’s system will not present the debilitating conflict of 
interest that MMS faced in the Gulf. 
II. Research and Follow-Through  
The next lesson from the Gulf that could be useful in Ohio is that 
of follow-through in research or investigation, especially when there is 
an indication of a potentially dangerous problem. According to the 
many investigations and reports following the Gulf coast disaster, 
failure to follow through on indicated safety issues was a persistent 
and ultimately devastating problem. This Part will provide some 
examples of insufficient follow-through on research from the Gulf 
experience, and will suggest that Ohio agencies demand better 
accountability from the drilling industry with respect to following 
 
162. STRONGER, supra note 151, at 28. 
163. Am. Sub. H.B. 153, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011). 
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through in determining the causes of accidents and preventing them 
from occurring in the future. 
A. Some Examples of Insufficient Research or Follow-Through  
in the Gulf 
In addition to facilitating the insufficient numbers and quality of 
inspections in the Gulf, underfunding of MMS meant that there were 
insufficient resources to do the research needed for responsible 
rulemaking.164 Fundamentally, there have been numerous and rapid 
changes in the technologies associated with oil and gas development 
and production in ultra-deep water as well as shale.165 With respect to 
offshore drilling advances, there have been improvements in offshore 
drilling rigs, including the advent and incorporation of dynamic 
positioning devices and more sophisticated navigation systems, 
enabling drilling in waters thousands of feet deep.166 Many of these 
advances have reduced adverse impacts for the environment. For 
example, according to a Department of Energy Report, technological 
advances in the oil and gas industry have led to the use of 22,000 
fewer wells than were necessary in 1985 to develop the same annual 
amount of oil and gas reserves,167 a decrease in drilling waste by as 
much as 148 million barrels due to increased well productivity,168 and 
a decrease in the drilling footprint of well pads in relation to 
production due to advances in drilling technology, such as modular 
drilling rigs and slimhole drilling.169 Also, the size and weight of 
drilling rigs have decreased, thus reducing their surface impact,170  
164. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 72–73 (because of inadequate 
funding, MMS could not keep regulations up to date with modern 
technologies). 
165. See David Blackmon, Horizontal Drilling: A Technological Marvel 
Ignored, Forbes (Jan. 28, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/davidblackmon/2013/01/28/horizontal-drilling-a-technological-
marvel-ignored (discussing the recent innovation in horizontal drilling 
and how it has enabled operators to maximize returns); see also Lynn 
Helms, Horizontal Drilling, N.D. Dep’t of Mineral Res. Newsl., Jan. 
2008, available at https://www.dmr.nd.gov/ndgs/newsletter/NL0308/ 
pdfs/Parshall.pdf (discussing three generations of horizontal drilling, 
including how the current generation has led to a dramatic boost in 
production rates). 
166. See Offshore Drilling, NaturalGas.org, http://www.naturalgas.org/ 
naturalgas/extraction_offshore.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (providing 
an overview of offshore drilling). 
167.  Office of Fossil Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Environmental 
Benefits of Advanced Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Technology 36 (1999). 
168.  Id. 
169.  Id. at 36, 38–39, 41. 
170.  Id. at 39. 
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while new exploration techniques have helped double the success rate 
of targeting productive wells, thereby reducing the amount dry 
holes.171 With respect to advances in shale oil and gas production 
technology in particular, in recent years increases in available 
horsepower have enabled drillers to accommodate horizontal wells 
rather than merely the vertical wells of the past.172 In addition, 
advances in the composition of fracturing fluids have led to better, 
longer lasting fractures in the target formation.173 Recovery of oil and 
gas via vertical drilling is strictly limited to the depth of the pipe 
itself; for example, when drilling into a shale formation 100 feet thick, 
vertical drilling allows one to reach only 100 feet of rock, and limits 
recovery to that amount.174 With the arrival of horizontal drilling, it is 
now possible for well operators to set a pipe horizontally through a 
mile or more of the same formation, thereby accessing 5,200 feet of 
rock rather than the 100 feet accessible using vertical drilling.175 
Drillers can now also drill extremely precisely, hitting specific targets 
far underground. It just makes sense that these advances would lead 
to vastly greater productivity. 
So, changes have occurred in the areas of technology, practice, 
and risk management. In the Gulf, this is due largely to the expansion 
of oil and gas exploration into ever-deeper waters, and the necessary 
and resulting advances in technology that make that drilling possible 
and largely successful. On land, the combination of hydraulic 
fracturing and horizontal drilling has also moved quickly, leaving 
regulators scrambling to keep up with advances in the way technology 
is used. In the Gulf, neither government nor industry had kept up 
sufficiently with these changes in terms of their ability to manage and 
oversee the safety of resulting operations.176 For example, rather than 
upgrading the requirements for modern blowout-preventer stacks, 
which had developed into the critical last line of defense for deepwater 
wells, the MMS actually began loosening its formerly frequent testing 
requirements, based upon assumptions that this new technology 
would be more reliable than the old technology.177 Furthermore, the 
agency took this action even though a series of studies conducted by 
the MMS and third parties raised the possibility of high failure rates 
 
171. Id. at 29. 
172. Blackmon, supra note 165. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 251. 
177. The MMS said the revised testing requirements could save industry 
$35–46 million per year without compromising safety. See MMS Eases 
Rule for BOP Testing, Oil & Gas J., June 8, 1998, at 32. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Applying Some Lessons from the Gulf Oil Spill to Hydraulic Fracturing 
1311 
for blowout systems and blind-shear rams under certain deepwater 
conditions.178 
This lack of funding and resources extended beyond the MMS and 
also affected the Coast Guard, which is responsible for regulating the 
“safety of life and property on Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 
facilities, vessels, and other units engaged in OCS activities.”179 That 
said, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks led to pressure on the 
Coast Guard to focus on border and port security, and as a result, the 
Coast Guard transferred much of its responsibility for fixed platform 
safety to the MMS in 2002.180 This further strained the already taxed 
MMS. 
As will be explained in the following sections, three examples of 
areas where MMS or the companies involved failed to follow through 
on research or investigation include kick detection, drilling techniques, 
and cleanup technologies. To be sure, advances in these areas were, 
and are, constant. The companies involved often are at the forefront 
of those advances, and their employees may be among the most 
knowledgeable on each of these subjects. Still, there is evidence that 
they moved too quickly towards oil production at the Macondo well, 
without following through on research or investigations that might 
well have been protective of people’s lives and the environment. There 
were well-documented instances where trouble was indicated and 
employees did not fully investigate and resolve the indicated 
problems, thus leaving the door open for disaster that might have 
been averted, and the responsible agency was not diligent about 
requiring follow-through on research or investigation. 
1. Kick detection 
Although I explicitly excised issues of engineering from this 
Article, one engineering-related issue is simply too important to 
ignore. At the time the Macondo blowout occurred, the crew was 
already aware that the well had experienced a “kick” in well pressure 
in the past. Specifically, on March 8, 2010, just a month before the 
disaster, the crew experienced a kick and what is almost 
euphemistically called a “well control event,” which they failed to 
 
178. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 71−74 (discussing MMS and third 
party technical tests conducted on new technologies). 
179. Outer Continental Shelf Activities, 33 C.F.R. § 140.1 (2012). 
180. Inspection Under, and Enforcement of, Coast Guard Regulations for 
Fixed Facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf by the Minerals 
Management Service, 67 Fed. Reg. 5912 (Feb. 7, 2002) (to be codified at 
33 C.F.R. pt. 140); see also Deep Water, supra note 1, at 75–76 
(explaining how the Coast Guard had failed to update safety rules and 
instead passed authority to MMS, thus stretching MMS’s inadequate 
resources even thinner). 
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detect during the thirty-minute period following it.181 Most of the crew 
members who were present for the March event were also on duty 
during the ultimate blowout.182 Rig management personnel have 
openly admitted that those individuals “screwed up by not catching 
the kick.”183 Most distressing, however, is that upon experiencing the 
“kick” or “well control event” in March, crew and management were 
not diligent in determining its causes with an eye toward preventing 
repetition of the problems. In fact, BP failed even to perform an 
incident investigation following the March event.184 A full 
investigation into the cause of the March event might well have 
prevented the April disaster. BP also did not inform people involved 
in the work at the rig of issues concerning the cementing job—
knowledge which also might have helped avoid the ensuing pressure 
problems.185 
Other failures to investigate or research test anomalies were 
documented as well.186 In particular, an engineer, Mark Hafle, failed to 
follow up with investigation of pressure test anomalies identified by 
another engineer, Donald Vidrine.187 The Joint Investigative Panel 
concluded that failure to address situations such as anomalous 
pressure test results and oddities in displacement operations 
 
181. Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 110. BP crewmembers 
“missed potential indications of problems during the March 8 event that 
they should have caught.” Id. But for additional information regarding 
the circumstances surrounding the earlier kick and BP’s reaction to it, 
see Deep Water, supra note 1, at 109–22, which describes the timeline 
of kick detection events and gives a rundown of the kick detection 
process and who is responsible for the various monitoring functions. 
182. Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 77 (noting that all 
except for one person, a mudlogger, were present for both events). 
183. Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
184. Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 195. 
185.  Id. at 69–70. 
186. See id. at 196 (listing failures to conduct tests and other potential 
contributing causes); see also Nat’l Comm. on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Macondo: The Gulf 
Oil Disaster, Chief Counsel’s Report 228 (2011) [hereinafter 
Chief Counsel’s Report] (“Despite knowing all of these cementing-
related risks, BP’s onshore team did not emphasize them to the 
individuals conducting the negative pressure test (including its own well 
site leaders). It also did not emphasize these risks to the individuals who 
were monitoring the well for kicks during riser displacement 
(Transocean and Sperry Drilling personnel), much less involve those 
individuals in discussions about how to mitigate the risks of cement 
failure.” (citing Testimony of Brett Cocales (BP), Hearing Before the 
Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team (Aug. 27, 2010) (transcript 
at 113))). 
187. Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 196. 
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contributed to well control failure.188 This failure to pursue obviously 
indicated investigations may also have contributed to the disaster. In 
fact, criminal charges against Vidrine and another top-ranking rig 
supervisor, Robert M. Kaluza, followed as a result of this failure to 
pursue “glaring red flags indicating that the well was not secure.”189 
Clearly, follow-through and completion of indicated investigations and 
research was a problem in the Gulf. 
Some of these issues lie in failure to detect a problem in the first 
(and the later) instance, and others lie in management and training 
problems—in particular, failure to communicate known risks, which 
should have been apparent going forward following the March kick.190 
Kicks are not common at the temporary abandonment stage of the 
drilling process—when the drilling rig is removed, later to be replaced 
with a production rig.191 The fact that a kick occurred at that stage 
should have raised some red flags. Apparently, several anomalies had 
occurred in the process that might have raised an alarm, but the crew 
 
188. Id. Incidentally, Vidrine and another top-ranking BP supervisor on the 
rig, Robert M. Kaluza, were indicted on twenty-three counts of criminal 
charges, including involuntary and seaman’s manslaughter, for allegedly 
ignoring warning signs that a blowout would occur and thus causing the 
explosion that sank the rig. See Steven Mufson, In Spill Deal, BP to 
Plead Guilty to Manslaughter, Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 2012, at A1 
(reporting the $4 billion payment being made by BP as the largest 
criminal settlement in U.S. history). 
189. Mufson, supra note 188. 
190. Transocean and BP did not have adequate procedures to address the 
risk or impact of decisions. See Chief Counsel’s Report, supra note 
186, at 244 (“I thought about this a lot yesterday and asked for input 
from the rig and none of us could come up with anything we are not 
already doing . . . . You can tell them what the hazards are, but until 
they get used to identifying them their selves, they are only following 
your lead . . . .”); see also id. at 181 (“By this point, rig personnel had 
observed several serious anomalies. Each was a sign that fluids are 
moving in the well. Those anomalies should have caused alarm. But 
there appears to have been no hint of alarm. The crew actively 
investigated the anomalies and performed diagnostic interventions. But 
it appears that the crew did not perform the most basic kick detection 
intervention—a flow check. If they had done so, they would have 
directly seen flow coming out of the well and should have shut in the 
well. The fact that the crew apparently did not perform a flow check 
suggests that [the drill crew] either did not consider or had already ruled 
out the possibility of a kick.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
191. Id. at 185 (“In a 2001 study of 48 deepwater kicks in the Gulf of 
Mexico, the vast majority of kicks occurred during drilling operations. 
By contrast, only one kick occurred in association with a well 
abandon[ment] operation.” (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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did not perform an indicated “flow check,” which would have alerted 
them to the fact that flow was coming out of the well.192  
Another related issue is that the crew had become, in the words 
of BP’s well team leader, “too comfortable.”193 They were so 
comfortable with explicable deviations from the norm that they 
effectively ceased questioning and reporting discrepancies and other 
issues of potential concern to the BP personnel onshore.194 In 
particular, BP personnel on the rig, when confronted with a negative 
pressure test that did not meet the applicable standards, chose to 
conduct an alternative test and explain away the problem.195 They did 
not pursue the problem and resolve it.196 This is a failure not only in 
training and communication, but fundamentally, it is a failure in 
research and follow-through. Research into the actual causes of the 
March kick might well have been pivotal in preventing the April 
disaster. That said, while drilling operators have acknowledged that 
kick detection was critical, they’ve also suggested that no technology 
was available to determine reliably the ultimate cause of a kick. 
2. Drilling Techniques  
Although drilling in deep water was not new at the time of the 
Gulf disaster, the 18,000 foot Macondo well was deeper than many of 
the wells that came before it,197 and several of the technologies used in 
drilling were relatively untested in very deep water and in the harsh 
conditions associated with it, including extremely high pressure.198 For 
example, the operation crew apparently never took the extreme 
pressure into account when evaluating the operation of the blowout 
preventer.199 This oversight led to the utilization of a material that  
192. Id. at 181. 
193. Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 110. 
194. Id.  
195. See Chief Counsel’s Report, supra note 186, at 183–84 (describing 
how the alternative kick detection was mediocre and dependent on 
human factors). “[S]ome of the sensors were not particularly accurate. 
For example, electronic sensors for pit volumes can be unreliable, so 
much so that the crew would sometimes revert to using a string with a 
nut to measure pit volume change. . . . [T]he sensors often lacked 
precision and responded to movement unrelated to the state of the 
well. . . . These shortcomings can result in rig personnel not receiving 
quality data and, furthermore, discounting the value of the data they do 
receive.” Id. at 184. 
196. Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 111 (explaining that 
despite decades of combined experience, supervisory personnel on the rig 
failed to communicate operational anomalies). 
197. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 96. 
198. Id. at 51. 
199. National Academy Report, supra note 7, at 71. 
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buckled under the high pressure and pushed the drill pipe up against 
the wellbore and away from the cutting reach of the blind shear 
rams.200 
There were several distinct challenges that arose from the move to 
ultra-deep water. For example, risers connecting a drilling vessel to 
the blowout preventer on the seafloor had to be lengthened 
substantially.201 This greater length caused them to be “exposed to 
strong ocean currents encountered in the central Gulf.”202 Also, 
“higher volumes of mud and drilling fluid were required in these long 
risers,” which made “drillers’ jobs more demanding.”203 Predictably, 
“[c]onnecting and maintaining blowout preventers thousands of feet 
beneath the surface can only be performed by remote-operating 
vehicles,” and the difficulty of this endeavor is only exacerbated by 
extremely “low temperatures and high pressures at the ocean 
bottom.”204 At that depth, well shut-in pressures can surpass 10,000 
pounds per square inch, bottom-hole temperatures can exceed 350 
degrees Fahrenheit, and salt and tar-zone formations can cause 
additional trouble.205 Further, methane hydrate, pockets of “[m]ethane 
gas locked in ice (‘fire ice’) forms at low temperature and high 
pressure,” and when disturbed “can activate the release of 160 cubic 
feet of gas from one cubic foot of methane, . . . destabilizing the 
drilling foundation.”206 
Despite these many difficulties, the drilling industry adapted 
quickly. They developed the spar platform, which allowed for greater 
stability in the drilling platforms.207 The design was essentially “a 
giant buoy consisting of a large-diameter, vertical cylinder supporting 
a deck for drilling and processing.”208 There were also advances in 
computer technology and remote-operating vehicles that allowed for 
maintenance and operation of the deep-water blowout preventers.209 
 
200. Id. at 69–70. 
201. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 51 (describing the challenges of 
ultra-deep-water drilling and production). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id.  
205. Id.  
206. Id. at 52. 
207. Id. at 48–49 (describing how geological conditions led to rapid 
innovation resulting in a transition away from semisubmersible wells to 
wells housed on a floating platform).  
208. Id. at 48. 
209. Id. at 51–52. 
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Welding techniques improved.210 The oil and gas industry was able to 
build the first floating production, offloading, and storage facility to 
facilitate production from the deep reservoirs of the Lower Tertiary 
geologic formation.211 This affected deep-water drilling directly, as it 
allowed for drilling further out from shore into much deeper waters.212 
Despite these technological advances, under these conditions the 
margin for error was small. The Joint Investigative Panel “concluded 
that the failure of the [blowout preventer] to shear the drill pipe and 
seal the wellbore was caused by the physical location of the drill 
pipe.”213 There were also numerous failures surrounding cementing 
methodologies and testing. So, the advances were many and 
significant, but the risks of human error remained enormous. 
B. Some Areas for Additional Research or Follow-Through in Ohio 
In Ohio, of course, there are also areas where follow-through could 
be improved and where additional research could prove protective of 
life, property, and the environment. For example, Ohio would benefit 
from research on the effects of a shale oil and gas wellhead blowout in 
this specific ecosystem. Drilling organizations often claim that as 
properly designed and executed, drilling for oil and gas in shale rock is 
sufficiently protective of the environment, in particular of the ground 
water through which the wells pass.214 It is true that there have been 
few instances of accidents causing groundwater contamination. But it 
has happened. As recently noted in National Geographic, 
“Catastrophic well-casing failures can happen at any time. The EPA 
is now investigating a 2011 blowout during fracking in a well near 
Killdeer[, North Dakota,] that pierced the aquifer the town relies 
 
210. Id. at 50. 
211. Id. at 51. 
212. Id. 
213. Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 198. 
214. See Hydraulic Fracturing: Safe Oil and Natural Gas Extraction–Video, 
Am. Petrol. Inst., http://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas-overview/ 
exploration-and-production/hydraulic-fracturing/hydraulic-fracturing-
safe-oil-natural-gas-extraction.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (providing 
an overview of the fracturing process); Frequently Asked Questions, 
Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., http://oilandgas.ohiodnr.gov/Citizens/ 
Oil-Gas-FAQ.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (providing answers to 
questions regarding the production of gas through fracking); see also 
Environment and Safety, Ohio Oil and Gas Ass’n, http://ooga.org/ 
our-industry/environment-safety (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (providing 
an overview of well construction in Ohio and government regulations 
designed to keep the environment, and water in particular, safe). 
“Whenever you penetrate the earth’s surface and create a well bore, 
there is some risk to the process. However, proper regulations and 
oversight by the Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management 
(DOGRM) helps to mitigate these risks.” Id. 
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on.”215 It is a known possibility that human error can cause well 
failure and a resulting blowout. Blowouts, as we know, can cause 
explosions, death, injuries, and harm to ecosystems. Because this 
event is a known possibility, not only as predicted in the Gulf, but 
also as proven in the hydraulic fracturing of shale in North Dakota, 
Ohio should heed the warnings these events provide. Ohio should 
follow through by conducting or commissioning research on the causes 
and prevention of shale well blowouts, and regulate accordingly. 
Additional research needs in Ohio include a stepped-up focus on 
cleanup protocols suited to Ohio’s ecosystems. It is well documented 
that the Gulf benefited from the natural presence of oil-eating 
microbes.216 Ohio’s ecosystem does include similar microbes far 
beneath the Earth’s surface, but they are of a different variety than 
those found in the Gulf.217 Although we are learning, we know very 
little about the ability of Ohio’s ecosystems to respond to large spills 
of oil or gas. Unlike the cleanup operations in the Gulf, which 
benefited from ocean current dispersion of the released oil,218 because 
Ohio’s shale operations are land based, both below ground and on the 
surface, they cannot benefit from ocean current dispersion of spills.  
 
215. Dobb, supra note 5, at 56. 
216. See Mengran Du & John D. Kessler, Assessment of the Spatial and 
Temporal Variability of Bulk Hydrocarbon Respiration Following the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 46 J. Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 10,499 (2012) 
(discussing a bloom of bacterial biomass in the Gulf of Mexico for a 
period of several months following the oil spill); see also Harlan Kirgan, 
Oil-Eating Bacteria Feasted on Oil from Deepwater Horizon’s Broken 
Well Says Scientist, GulfLive.com (July 28, 2011, 6:45 AM), 
http://blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-press-news/2011/07/oil-eating_bact 
eria_feasted_on.html (discussing how large quantities of oil-eating 
bacteria devoured the oil spilled by Deepwater Horizon). 
217. See Spencer Hunt, Creatures Thrive in ‘Fracking’ Wells, Columbus 
Dispatch (Jan. 6, 2013, 8:40 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/ 
stories/science/2013/01/06/creatures-thrive-in-fracking-wells.html (men-
tioning a study to determine whether microbes are native to local shales 
or were introduced by drillers). 
218. See David Biello, How Going with the Flow Helped Microbes Eat BP’s 
Oil Spill, Sci. Am. (Jan. 9, 2012), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/ 
observations/2012/01/09/how-going-with-the-flow-helped-microbes-eat-bps-
oil-spill (“Water mixing ensured that the 200 billion grams of hydrocar-
bons injected into the Gulf of Mexico became, ultimately, some 100 
sextillion microbial cells of propane- and ethane-consuming Colwellia, 
aromatic-eating Cycloclasticus, methane-munching Methylococcaceaa, 
alkane-eating Oceanospirillales. They also ensured that hydrocarbons were 
introduced into waters already hosting microbe blooms spurred by earlier 
oil and gas releases. The team of researchers suggest that this 
‘autoinoculation’—early blooms drifting back to the spill site and chowing 
down anew—allowed the microbes to work fast over the course of the 
months-long disaster as well as keeping oxygen depletion from growing too 
severe in any one place.”). 
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It is well known that human error, particularly with respect to 
the cement job, was an important factor in the circumstances 
surrounding the Gulf spill.219 Consequently, additional research in 
Ohio on technology that would allow for better understanding and 
assessment of the cement jobs would be valuable because the integrity 
of the wells generally hinges on the quality of the cementing job. 
Errors in cementing can cause an accident at the wellhead, or an 
accident “down hole.”220 It would be good to have a clearer 
understanding of the realistic worst-case scenario of a wellhead or 
down-hole accident in Ohio and to understand whether Ohio is 
prepared to handle an accident that meets or exceeds a predicted 
worst-case scenario. That is, in the vicinity of each well, does Ohio 
have an appropriate number of specifically trained emergency 
responders, appropriate vehicles, and approved and proven 
dispersants?  
In terms of follow-through, Ohio has room for improvement as 
well. For example, in May 2012, the ODNR stated a goal of tripling 
the number of inspectors by the end of 2012—which would have 
increased its capacity to a total of ninety inspectors on staff.221 As of 
December 2012, the department only had “36 full-time inspectors, 8 
supervisors with inspection duties, and 9 vacant inspector 
positions.”222 Currently, DOGRM has forty-six field inspectors, is in 
the process of hiring more, and has six additional employees who, 
although not inspectors, help with field inspection.223 Thus, one area 
that can be improved is simply following through with goals that the 
agency has set for itself, be it with staffing or creating a new 
environment of safety compliance and awareness. These are lessons 
Ohio could heed from watching the experiences in the Gulf. 
 
219. See David Hammer, Six Fateful Missteps: Several Decisions, Seemingly 
Separate—And One Final Mechanical Meltdown—Combined to Ignite 
the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, Times-Picayune, Sept. 5, 2010, at A1 
(laying out six errors and a timeline). 
220. Rachel Ehrenberg, The Facts Behind the Frack, ScienceNews, Sept. 8, 
2012, http://www.sciencenews.org/view/feature/id/343202/description/ 
The_Facts_Behind_the_Frack; see also Russell Gold, Faulty Wells, 
Not Fracking, Blamed For Water Pollution, Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 
2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304537904577277 
814040731688.html.  
221. Joe Guillen, Whatever Happened to the State’s Plan to Triple the 
Number of Oil and Gas Inspectors as Fracking Intensifies in Ohio?, 
Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Dec. 30, 2012, at B7. 
222. Id. 
223. Telephone Interview by Glenn Morrical with Kelly Robbins, Ohio Dep’t 
of Natural Res. (May 3, 2013).  
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III. Emergency Planning and Preparedness 
The third lesson from the Gulf from which Ohio should learn is 
the importance of emergency preparedness and planning for disaster. 
In the Gulf, the quality of planning and preparedness for disaster was 
shameful. By focusing on that lack of planning and its disastrous 
result in the Gulf, perhaps Ohio agencies, organizations, businesses, 
and lawmakers can improve their emergency planning and 
preparedness. 
A. Emergency Planning and Preparedness in the Gulf 
Federal law required an emergency response plan for deepwater 
rigs, but because BP had calculated its “worst case scenario” to be 
lower than the threshold level required to trigger a site-specific 
emergency response plan, no such plan was required or created.224 A 
fifty-two-page section of the regional plan focused on the Deepwater 
Horizon, but it was vague and unspecific regarding response 
procedures for the rig.225 If there had been a site-specific emergency 
response plan, the plan would have specifically directed rig personnel 
to precise procedures for handling the spill. Instead, the company was 
allowed to submit a more generic plan applicable to the entire Gulf of 
Mexico region, in which it was operating approximately seventy wells 
and holding hundreds of leases.  
The 582-page Gulf Oil Response Plan226 for the Gulf of Mexico 
region was not specific to any rig, and had bits copied from plans 
written for drilling operations in Alaska.227 It referred to walruses, 
which live near BP’s Alaskan operations but have no habitat near the 
Gulf of Mexico.228 It included nonfunctional contact information, 
apparently copied from older reports. The plan, to the extent it 
pertained to the Gulf Region, rather than the coast of Alaska, relied 
on local resources—local fire response, local boats, and local stores of 
berms.229 But it ultimately turned out that there were not enough  
224. Nicholas P. Cheremisinoff & Anton Davietshin, Emergency 
Response Management of Offshore Oil Spills: Guidelines for 
Emergency Responders 47 (2010). 
225. See, e.g., Holbrook Mohr et al., BP’s Gulf Oil Spill Response Plan Lists 
the Walrus as a Local Species. Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal is Furious, 
Christian Sci. Monitor (June 9, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
From-the-news-wires/2010/0609/BP-s-gulf-oil-spill-response-plan-lists-th 
e-walrus-as-a-local-species.-Louisiana-Gov.-Bobby-Jindal-is-furious. 
226. BP, Regional Oil Spill Response Plan—Gulf of Mexico (2009). 
227. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 84. 
228. Id.; see also Mohr et al., supra note 225 (“Under the heading ‘sensitive 
biological resources,’ the plan lists marine mammals including walruses, 
sea otters, sea lions and seals. None lives anywhere near the Gulf.”). 
229. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 84. 
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boats on the ground (or in the water!), and the operators of those 
boats were not specifically trained for a disaster of the magnitude that 
occurred.230 There weren’t enough berms or booms, and the chemical 
oil dispersants were not easily accessible.231 The spill response and 
mitigation efforts of the drillers, regulators, and responders was, at 
least at first, uncoordinated.232 When disaster struck, emergency plans 
and preparedness proved insufficient. 
The period of time between the first explosion and the final 
evacuation of the living employees from the rig was wrought with 
mishaps and unexpected circumstances. Still, employees on the rig 
have said in the aftermath of the disaster that there had been a 
strong safety culture on the rig—lots of rules and strict penalties for 
failure to follow them, and regular safety drills.233 Despite this 
apparent safety culture, it does not appear that employees were 
trained to handle some of the dangerous eventualities that came to 
pass when the rig exploded.234 Furthermore, based upon the number of 
disastrous or potentially disastrous workplace incidents caused by BP 
in the past,235 there seems to be evidence that BP’s safety approach 
was oriented towards individual worker occupational safety, as 
opposed to overall process safety or major catastrophe prevention.236 
For instance, the Safety Board’s report on the Texas City refinery 
explosion, which occurred in 2005, noted that “while most attention 
was focused on the injury rate, the overall safety culture and process 
safety management (PSM) program had serious deficiencies.”237 In 
 
230. Id. at 141.  
231. Id. at 265. 
232. Id. 
233. See, Joint Investigative Report, supra note 1, at 183–84 (listing 
testimony from a BP supervisor extolling the safety values engrained by 
the company’s policies). “Notwithstanding BP’s health and safety 
policies . . . the Panel found BP conducted drilling operations at 
Macondo in a manner that increased the risks of the project.” Id. at 184.  
234. Id. at 183–84; see also David Barstow, Deepwater Horizon’s Final 
Hours, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 2010, at 1 (“The Horizon was like a Gulf 
Coast town that regularly rehearsed for Category 1 hurricanes but never 
contemplated the one-hundred-year storm. The crew members, though 
expert in responding to the usual range of well problems, were 
unprepared for a major blowout followed by explosions, fires and a total 
loss of power.”). 
235. These incidents included a Texas City refinery explosion, North Sea gas 
line rupture, and a Scottish main steam pipe rupture, among others. See 
Deep Water, supra note 1, at 218–19. 
236. Id. at 218. 
237. U.S. Chem. Safety & Hazard Investigation Bd., Investigation 
Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire 19 (2005). 
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addition, there was major confusion regarding the appropriate chain 
of command for the emergency situation that ensued, which, when 
compounded with the number of contractors and subcontractors 
involved in the drilling operations, left fleeing employees unsure about 
the procedures to be followed.238 
Additionally, it would be irresponsible to discuss the safety 
culture in the oil and gas industry without mentioning the 
involvement of the American Petroleum Institute (API). In the 
United States, the API plays a significant role in developing safety 
standards for the oil and gas industry.239 The API, which possesses 
great technical expertise, produces standards, recommended practices, 
specifications, codes, technical specifications, reports, and studies.240 
The U.S. Department of the Interior formally adopts many of these 
recommended standards and practices as regulations.241 Unfortunately, 
it has become apparent that the “API’s ability to serve as a reliable 
standard-setter for drilling safety is compromised by its role as the 
industry’s principal lobbyist and public policy advocate.”242 
 
238. Id. at 26 (noting BP’s “ ‘check the box’ mentality” and employees’ fear 
of reporting potential problems due to possible retaliation). 
239. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 225 (“Since 1924, API has 
developed industry standards and practices that promote reliability and 
safety through the use of proven engineering practices. API standards 
are developed through a collaborative effort among industry experts, 
technical experts from government, and other interested stakeholders. 
The industry has helped create more than 500 standards, including some 
240 exploration and production standards that address offshore 
operations.”). 
240. See Am. Petrol. Inst., API 2010 Publication Programs and 
Services (2010) (listing API standards, recommended practices, equipment 
specifications, other technical documents, reports, and studies). 
241. See The Deepwater Horizon Incident: Are the Minerals Management 
Service Regulations Doing the Job?: Oversight Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Resources of the H. Comm. on 
Natural Res., 111th Cong. 98 (2010) (statement of Erik Milito, Grp. 
Dir., Upstream & Indus. Operations, Am. Petrol. Inst.) (“Seventy-eight 
of these standards are referenced in Minerals Management Service 
regulations.”). For MMS rulemakings that incorporate industry 
standards into regulations over time, see Oil and Gas and Sulphur 
Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,019 (Nov. 
26, 1996) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250); Oil and Gas and Sulphur 
Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Pipelines and Pipeline 
Rights-of-Way, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,442 (Oct. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 30 
C.F.R. pts. 250, 253, 254 & 256). See also News Release, MMS, Minerals 
Management Service to Adopt the Latest Edition of Industry Standard 
on Fixed Offshore Production Platforms (Apr. 21, 2003) available at 
http://www.boem.gov/boem-newsroom/press-releases/2003/press0421.aspx 
(discussing the MMS regulations and proposed amendments to 30 C.F.R 
pt. 250). 
242. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 225. 
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Specifically, because increases in safety requirements often make 
operations more costly, API regularly resists agency rulemaking that 
would make operations safer.243 For instance, the API led the effort to 
persuade the MMS not to adopt a new regulatory approach known as 
the Safety and Environmental Management System, advocating 
instead for continued reliance on voluntary and recommended safety 
practices.244 Additionally, the API opposed revisions to the incident-
reporting rule that would likely have better identified safety risks 
across the industry.245 “As described by one representative, API-
proposed safety standards have increasingly failed to reflect ‘best 
industry practices’ and have instead expressed the ‘lowest common 
denominator’—in other words, a standard that almost all operators 
could readily achieve.”246 It seems clear that in addition to the 
reorganization of the MMS, agencies at all levels should ensure that 
the technical experts relied upon for creating safety practices do not 
have an inherent conflict that could impair their ability to act in the 
best interest of the public, rather than the regulated industry. 
1. Safety Training on the Deepwater Horizon  
Although rig workers regularly participated in emergency drills 
and the rig presented an environment that appeared to be focused on 
safety, operators never prepared for the worst.247 For example, 
practice drills had not been carried out in the absence of reliable 
communication technology, as was the case during the disaster, or in 
circumstances that simulated the total confusion in chains of 
command that occurred in the wake of the explosion. Further, for all 
the evacuation drills, “they had never rehearsed inflating and lowering 
the raft.”248 
According to workers on the rig, training sessions contemplated a 
blowout coming up through only the drilling pipe. This blowout, 
however, did not play by the rules. “I had no idea it could do what it 
did,” said floorhand Caleb Holloway.249 As originally designed, the 
emergency gas detection system should automatically trigger the 
general master alarm—the shrill warning that signaled for evacuation 
 
243. Id. (citing Letter from Allen Verret, Offshore Operators Comm., & Tim 
Sampson, Am. Petrol. Inst., to the U.S. Minerals Mgmt. Serv. (Sept. 15, 
2009)). 
244. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 228. 
245. Id. (citing an unpublished Commission interview with Elmer Danenberger, 
a technical consultant in the oil drilling industry and formerly of MMS). 
246. Id. at 225. 
247. Barstow, supra note 234. 
248.  Id.  
249. Id.  
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of the rig—if it detected high levels of gas.250 Transocean, though, had 
set the alarm system so that the general master alarm had to be 
activated manually, rather than automatically.251 This was done, 
apparently, so it wouldn’t wake people up at night in the event of an 
accidental trigger.252  
Another rig worker, Yancy Keplinger, the crew member in charge 
of monitoring danger alarms on the Deepwater Horizon, was on the 
bridge at the time of the blowout. 253 The alarms, in addition to 
flashing magenta, were making a warning sound.254 Keplinger testified 
that he repeatedly attempted to silence the alarms so he could think 
about what to do next. “I don’t think anybody was trained for the 
massive detectors that were going off that night,” he said.255 
Witnesses differ about what exactly happened next. But they 
agree on a basic point: even with the Deepwater Horizon burning, 
powerless, and gutted by explosions, there was still substantial 
resistance to the strongest possible measure that might have saved the 
rig. The Emergency Disconnect System, which operates like an eject 
button, would have disconnected the rig from the wellhead, removing 
the fire’s fuel source and possibly sealing the well. But according to 
Chris Pleasant, who was stationed on the bridge, the captain told 
him, “No, calm down, we’re not hitting E.D.S.”256  
2. Lack of Clarity in Chain of Command 
Apparently, when the rig is “latched-up” to the well, the person 
in command is a BP employee.257 When the rig is not attached, or it is 
in a state of emergency, it is considered a sea vessel and the captain is 
in charge.258 State of emergency, however, is very loosely defined, and 
according to the Officer Installation Manager “that would be if say 
 
250. U.S. Coast Guard & Minerals Mgmt. Serv., USCG/MMS 
Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, 
Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore 
Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the 
Gulf Of Mexico 21–22 April 2010 310–11 (2010) [hereinafter Coast 
Guard Investigation]. 
251. Barstow, supra note 234. 
252. Id. 
253. Deepwater Horizon Incident Joint Investigation, Yancy Keplinger 
Testimony Part 2, C-SPAN Video Library (Oct. 5, 2010), http:// 
www.c-spanvideo.org/program/295830-3. 
254. Id. at 02:31:00–02:33:08.  
255.  Id. at 02:33:50. 
256. Barstow, supra note 234. 
257. Coast Guard Investigation, supra note 250, at 38.  
258. Id.  
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[the captain] thought some of the key personnel were taken out say 
for this explosion, for instance.”259 There were explicit safety and 
command protocols for several situations, but not for a situation 
where it was unclear whether the rig was attached or unattached.260 
When the explosion occurred, rendering electronic monitoring 
equipment and communications systems unreliable or inoperable, 
employees struggled to determine the proper chain of command and, 
therefore, the proper safety protocols.261 For instance, the vessel’s 
“written procedures required multiple people jointly to make decisions 
about how to respond to ‘dangerous’ levels of gas—a term that wasn’t 
precisely defined—and some members of the crew were unclear about 
who had authority to initiate an emergency shutdown of the well.”262 
In fact, according to some reports, employees were rushing about and 
shouting to figure out whether the rig was attached, detached, or in 
an emergency situation, and, therefore, who was in command of the 
emergency.263 The situation was, quite understandably, chaotic. This 
lack of clarity in the chain of command led to many instances of 
confusion during the immediate blowout crisis, which almost certainly 
hampered efforts to avert or contain it. 
3. Untested Cleanup Methods  
Although BP’s response plan called for the use of oil dispersants, 
the selected dispersants had not been thoroughly tested prior to use. 
Variations of the dispersants that were ultimately spread by air over 
the waters of the Gulf and injected underwater near the sources of oil 
had been tested, but the variety ultimately used was less well 
understood and was used in unprecedentedly large quantities.264 As a 
result, the EPA instituted a moratorium on their use partway 
through the cleanup process to assess the potential effects and 
 
259. Id. at 39. 
260. See Keplinger Testimony Part 2, supra note 253, at 02:33:57. 
261. U.S. Coast Guard Investigation, supra note 250, at 48–49 
(discussing the trauma and chaos employees experienced after the 
explosion). 
262. Douglas A. Blackmon et al., There Was ‘Nobody in Charge,’ Wall St. 
J. (May 28, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748 
704113504575264721101985024.html. 
263. Jon Espen Skogdalen, Jahon Khorsandi & Jan Erik Vinnem, Looking 
Back and Forward—Evacuation, Escape and Rescue (EER) from the 
Deepwater Horizon Rig 10 (Jan. 2011) (unpublished Deepwater Horizon 
Study Group Working Paper), available at http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/ 
pdfs_papers/DHSGWorkingPapersFeb16-2011/EvacuationEscapeAndR 
escue%20_EER_%20fromDeepwaterHorizonRig-JES_JK_JEV_DHSG-
Jan2011.pdf. 
264. U.S. Coast Guard, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Incident 
Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) 43 (2011) [hereinafter ISPR]. 
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damages they might cause.265 Because the dispersants required re-
evaluation by the EPA, this process delayed the operations that 
might have led to less oil reaching the shorelines.266 Substantial 
research had been undertaken on dispersants in the last several 
decades, but the results of that research were not well communicated 
to the people running response operations in the Gulf.267 Even so, 
there were lingering concerns about the high volume of dispersants 
being deployed and especially their use deep underwater at the 
wellhead, which was a “novel use” of the dispersant.268 Regardless of 
the fact that the EPA ultimately found the dispersant safe enough for 
use in this circumstance, this type of study should have been 
completed prior to the occurrence of an emergency calling for its use. 
The afterthought nature of the study delayed what might have been a 
speedier, more effective response to the event.  
4. Insufficient Resources to Implement the Emergency Cleanup Plan  
Although emergency safety procedures and cleanup plans were in 
place in the Gulf, they did not present strategies sufficient, or 
sometimes even suitable, to the environmental conditions of the Gulf 
or to the resources available in the area. For example, although the 
plan called for reliance on local watercraft, the boats in the area were 
neither sufficiently numerous nor were crews sufficiently trained for 
the scope of the disaster that occurred.269 Even the on-board 
firefighters were not sufficiently trained for the circumstances. “We 
weren’t trained to fight a blowout fire,” said Matt Jacobs, a firefighter 
who went straight to the lifeboats when the blowout occurred.270  
In addition, the response plans called, in part, for the use of 
berms to stop oil from flowing into the coastline.271 Although berms 
can be quite effective in flat, calm water, they are predictably less 
effective when water is choppy.272 So, they work well in lakes but are 
less effective in the ocean. 
The plan, such as it was, did not present a “worst-case scenario” 
strategy that was executable on the ground—or water. BP’s oil-spill 
response plan for the Gulf of Mexico was outdated, unreliable and 
incomplete. For example, BP “claimed that response vessels provided 
 
265. Id. at 42. 
266. Id. at 41.  
267. Id. at 40. 
268. Id. at 42. 
269. Id. at 104.  
270.  Barstow, supra note 234.  
271. See Deep Water, supra note 1, at 153–57. 
272. Id. at 169, 271. 
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by the Marine Spill Response Corporation and other private oil-spill 
removal organizations could recover nearly 500,000 barrels of oil per 
day.”273 This proved not to be true.274 Though incremental improve-
ments in skimming and boom technologies had been realized in the 
intervening twenty-one years, the technologies proposed for use in 
response to the Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez oil spills were 
largely the same.275 The plan was outdated. For example, it called on 
noted experimental biologist Peter Lutz to be its wildlife expert, but 
he had died several years before the plan was submitted.276  
MMS was the sole government agency charged with 
understanding deepwater wells and related [drilling or safety] 
technology, such as [blowout preventers]. But its supervision of 
the containment effort was limited, in line with its role in 
overseeing deepwater drilling more generally. Its staff did not 
attempt to dictate whether BP should perform an operation, 
determine whether it had a significant likelihood of success, or 
suggest consideration of other options. This limited role 
stemmed in part from a lack of resources. At most, MMS had 
four to five employees in Houston trying to oversee BP’s efforts. 
One employee described his experience as akin to standing in a 
hurricane.277  
And the cleanup response, some have argued, was more politically 
motivated than it was focused on the environment. Ultimately, Coast 
Guard responders distributed many miles of boom according to 
political, rather than operational, imperatives. They reported feeling 
trapped “by the outrage that resulted when a parish or state felt 
slighted by allocation decisions, so they placed boom wherever they 
could.”278  
 
273. Id. at 132. 
274. See BP’s Role, Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling, http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/ 
media/response/institutional-bps-role.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) 
(“Despite these claims, the oil-spill removal organizations were quickly 
outmatched.”). If the recovery rate was truly 500,000 barrels a day, 
response personnel should easily have recovered the 35,000 to 60,000 
barrels a day that was flowing out. Flow Rate Technical Grp., U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, Assessment of Flow Rate Estimates for 
the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well Oil Spill 1 (2011). 
275. Henry Fountain, Since Exxon Valdez, Little Has Changed in Cleaning 
Spills, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2010, at A23.  
276. Deep Water, supra note 1, at 133. 
277. Id. at 135. 
278. Id. at 153. 
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5. Lack of Regionally Unified Spill Response  
Another problematic area with regard to emergency preparedness 
was the lack of a regionally unified oil spill response. Despite the 
federal efforts, the affected Gulf States each undertook a cleanup 
operation with an individually focused agenda, so the efforts were not 
particularly cohesive. For instance, as the states were working to 
curtail the effects of the spill, local organizers were pushing them to 
adopt solutions that would create jobs for their local economy. Gulf 
state governors and other state political officials participated in the 
response in unprecedented ways, often “taking [important] decisions 
out of the hands of career oil spill responders”279 and making 
politically expedient decisions, such as those that would create the 
most work for individuals—their constituents.280 These high-level state 
officials, usually politicians, were unfamiliar with oil-spill-response 
planning.281 In Louisiana, for example, the state government declined 
to empower the officials assigned to work with federal responders 
within the Unified Coast Guard Command with decision-making 
authority. Specifically, Louisiana did not even allow those 
representatives to approve the daily agenda of response activities.282 
Instead, Louisiana required that most decisions go through its own 
Governor’s office.283 
B. Emergency Preparedness, Planning, and Risk Management in Ohio 
In Ohio, the ODNR, which has statutory “sole and exclusive 
authority” to regulate oil and gas drilling operations, does not require 
specific emergency plans for those operations. To aid emergency 
crews, however, the ODNR maintains a website designed to allow 
“emergency response personnel and planners to find well locations and 
detailed well information, as well as contacts and phone numbers for 
emergency situations.”284 According to the site, its purpose is to  
 
279. Id. at 138.  
280. Id. at 138–39, 140–41. 
281. ISPR, supra note 264, at 6.  
282. See Coastal Prot. & Restoration Auth. of La., State of 
Louisiana Initial Oil Spill Response Plan, Deepwater Horizon 
Incident 2 (2010) (“[T]he latest intelligence information on oil location 
and forecases will drive the location and intensity of activity. It is 
assumed that the logistics and coordination will be executed by the 
[local response organizations] tasked with the effort.”).  
283. See id. (describing the process through which local response organizations 
were to funnel their decisions through state executive agencies).  
284. Emergency Response, Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., http://oilandgas. 
ohiodnr.gov/Well-Information/Emergency-Response.aspx (last visited Apr. 
6, 2013). 
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improve response times to oil and gas well emergencies by oil 
and gas well owners, state regulatory personnel and local 
emergency responders to reduce public health and 
environmental risks[,] . . . facilitate full compliance with spill 
reporting requirements[,] . . . [and] eliminate burdensome 
Community-Right-To-Know paper reporting requirements while 
providing a more efficient, convenient and comprehensive 
information system for local officials.285  
This is helpful, for sure, but it is not a site-specific, well-planned 
emergency response plan. 
The federal Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) 
program also pertains to emergency response planning for oil and gas 
handlers in Ohio.286 Because Ohio has not created its own rules under 
the SPCC program, facilities in the state that are subject to SPCC 
requirements must satisfy the default federal rules.287 SPCC rules 
specifically cover oil drilling, production, and refining facilities and 
require them to prepare an emergency plan if, due to the facility’s 
location, a spill “could reasonably be expected to reach a waterway” 
or sewer.288 Plans must be written to show how a facility would 
control a spill, including, for example, “a written commitment of 
manpower, equipment and materials to expeditiously control and 
remove any amount of oil that may be spilled.”289 These rules would 
apply to many Ohio shale operations. Still, although Ohio EPA’s 
Division of Emergency and Remedial Response is responsible for 
conducting investigations on behalf of the federal SPCC program,290 
the agency does not actually approve SPCC plans. Rather, the facility 
itself verifies, through a management sign-off, that its SPCC plan is 
properly implemented and meets the federal requirements.291 To 
reiterate, the rules require the facility to prepare a plan, but they do 
not require that any regulator approve it, or even read it.  
285. Id. 
286. Office of Compliance Assistance & Pollution Prevention, 
Ohio EPA, Understanding the Spill Prevention, Control and 
Countermeasure (SPCC) Requirements 1–2 (2009). 
287. See id. at 3 (discussing how the Ohio EPA does not approve SPCC 
plans, but does require entities that release large quantities of oil to 
submit such plans to the U.S. EPA).  
288. Id. at 1.  
289. Id. at 2.  
290. Regulation of Above Ground Oil and Petroleum Product Storage Tanks, 
Ohio EPA, http://ohioepa.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/308 
/~/regulation-of-above-ground-oil-and-petroleum-product-storage-tanks 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
291. Office of Compliance Assistance & Pollution Prevention, 
supra note 286, at 3.  
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With regard to reporting requirements, which, when made 
publically available can help with safety and emergency planning, 
Ohio’s  
SB 165 requires the operator to submit, along with the well 
completion report, copies of the well stimulation log, the 
fracture pressure chart and the invoices, which provide a record 
of what happened on the job, including materials that were 
used, when they were used, and in what volumes, as well as 
whether well integrity has been maintained throughout the 
operation.292  
The bill also required the DMRM293 to maintain Material Safety Data 
Sheet (MSDS) information on chemicals used in the fracturing 
process.294 If a chemical used in fracturing is one for which the 
angency does not already have an MSDS, the operator must obtain a 
copy of the applicable MSDS and provide it.295 This information is 
important because it is used by emergency responders in the event of 
a spill or other incident. Senate Bill 315 also added a requirement for 
including Chemical Abstract Services (CAS) numbers,296 and although 
DOGRM has this requirement, a proprietary secrets exemption 
 
292. STRONGER, supra note 149, at 4. 
293. Note that although S.B. 165 referred to the ODNR Division of 
Resources Management, H.B. 153 later created a separate Division of 
Oil and Gas Resources Management, which has taken over these 
statutory obligations.  
294. Id. at 14. 
295. Id.; see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.10(E) (West 2012) (“If a 
material listed or designated under division (A)(9) or (10) or (B)(3) of 
this section is a material for which the division of oil and gas resources 
management does not have a material safety data sheet, the owner shall 
provide a copy of the material safety data sheet for the material to the 
chief.”) 
296. See STRONGER, supra note 149, at 14 (discussing how DMRM was 
considering adding a requirement for the CAS numbers in January 
2011); see also Mike Chadsey, Improved Regulations Set the Stage for 
Increased Shale Development, Energy In Depth (Sept. 8, 2012), 
http://www.eidohio.org/senate-bill-315-in-the-books (“The additives 
used must be disclosed to the Division of Mineral Resource Management 
(DMRM) . . . .”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.10(A)(9) (“[T]he 
owner shall include a list of all chemicals, not including any information 
that is designated as a trade secret pursuant to division (I)(1) of this 
section, intentionally added to all products, fluids, or substances and 
include each chemical’s corresponding chemical abstracts service number 
and the maximum concentration of each chemical. The owner shall 
obtain the chemical information, not including any information that is 
designated as a trade secret pursuant to division (I)(1) of this section, 
from the company that drilled the well, provided service at the well, or 
supplied the chemicals.”). 
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remains.297 If specific chemical constituents of hydraulic fracturing 
fluids are not included on the MSDS, the agency can request 
submission of the specific chemical information. If the operator does 
not submit this chemical information, the agencies may impose 
penalties.298 
However, the MSDS does not always contain the precise chemical 
elements of a listed product.299 DOGRM should consider this 
problem—whether the agency will be receiving all the chemical 
information necessary for sufficient investigation and emergency 
response from the MSDS alone.300 Additional information may be 
necessary for adequate emergency response, particularly for medical 
 
297. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.10(I)(1) (“The owner of a well who is 
required to submit a well completion record under division (A) of this 
section or a report under division (B)(3) of this section or a person that 
provides information to the owner as described in and for purposes of 
division (A)(9) or (10) or (B)(3) of this section may designate without 
disclosing on a form prescribed by the chief and withhold from disclosure 
to the chief the identity, amount, concentration, or purpose of any 
product, fluid, or substance or of any chemical component in a product, 
fluid, or substance designated as a trade secret . . . .” (emphasis 
added)).  
298. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.99(A) (“Whoever violates sections 
1509.01 to 1509.31 of the Revised Code or any rules adopted or orders 
or terms or conditions of a permit issued pursuant to these sections for 
which no specific penalty is provided in this section shall be fined not 
less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars for a first 
offense; for each subsequent offense the person shall be fined not less 
than two hundred nor more than two thousand dollars.”). 
299. See generally Matthew McFeeley, Natural Res. Def. Council, 
State Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Rules and Enforcement: 
A Comparison (2012) (discussing the rules employed by various states 
regarding disclosure of the chemicals used in fracking). 
300. See Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2012). Section (c), 
which lists definitions, supports the assertion that OSHA’s regulations 
that govern MSDSs limit the information operators must disclose. The 
reason is that only “hazardous chemicals” need to be disclosed on 
MSDSs, and a chemical must have been subject to significant testing 
before it will be considered hazardous under the applicable regulations. 
But there is no requirement that the chemicals used in the exploration 
and production of shale oil and gas be subjected to this important 
analysis, and they therefore are not declared hazardous nor required to 
be disclosed on MSDSs. Id.; see also Earthjustice, Citizen Petition 
Under Toxic Substances Control Act, regarding the Chemical 
Substances and Mixtures Used in Oil and Gas Exploration or 
Production 7 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/ 
chemtest/pubs/Section_21_Petition_on_Oil_Gas_Drilling_and_Frac
king_Chemicals8.4.2011.pdf (discussing that the requirement that only 
“hazardous materials” need to be disclosed on MSDSs presents a major 
problem, because MSDSs are one of the public’s primary hazardous 
chemical accountability mechanisms).  
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treatment. Ohio is an early adopter of regulations that require 
operators to disclose all chemicals used in the fracturing fluid, even 
those that amount to trade secrets, in instances of medical 
necessity.301 The problem is that operators purchase fracturing fluid 
from vendors who maintain proprietary secrecy over the formulation 
of the fluid. Operators claim that they cannot disclose what they do 
not know. So, the system needs work. 
Related to safety issues surrounding a damaged well, Ohio law 
allows the Chief of DMRM (now DOGRM) to order the plugging of a 
well that has been irreparably damaged.302 In an emergency, the 
agency can deliver plugging order electronically in as little as thirty 
minutes. If an order is issued, the company must obtain a plugging 
permit and provide notice to DMRM (now DOGRM) at least forty-
eight hours prior to plugging.303 If an operator fails to take action to 
plug a well within a reasonable period of time, DMRM (now 
DOGRM) may plug the well on its own, with costs of that action to 
be reimbursed by the operator. An inspector must be on site to 
witness plugging unless DMRM (now DOGRM) waives this 
requirement.304 
 
301. Ohio, like most states, has given industry a “free pass” under a trade 
secrets exemption, and includes no process for factual justification of a 
trade secrets claim for nondisclosure of fracturing chemicals. Still, Ohio 
does provide for access to trade secret information for health care 
providers and does not require that medical professionals sign a 
confidentiality agreement to get that information. The medical 
professional is prohibited by law from sharing confidential information 
regarding the nature of chemical involved. McFeeley, supra note 299, at 
12–13 (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.10(H)(2), amended by S.B. 
315, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012)); see also Zehringer, 
supra note 142 (discussing the changes in S.B. 315). 
302. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.12:  
When the chief finds that a well should be plugged, the chief 
shall notify the owner to that effect by order in writing and shall 
specify in such order a reasonable time within which to comply. 
No owner shall fail or refuse to plug a well within the time 
specified in the order. Each day on which such a well remains 
unplugged thereafter constitutes a separate offense. 
Where the plugging method prescribed by rules adopted 
pursuant to section 1509.15 of the Revised Code cannot be 
applied or if applied would be ineffective in carrying out the 
protection that the law is meant to give, the chief, by order, 
may designate a different method of plugging. The abandonment 
report shall show the manner in which the well was plugged. 
303. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.13(A) (“No person shall plug and 
abandon a well without having a permit to do so issued by the chief of 
the division of oil and gas resources management.”). 
304. STRONGER, supra note 149, at 5; see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 1509.13(C) (“No well shall be plugged and abandoned without an oil 
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Despite these positive steps in Ohio, to assure proper preparedness, 
Ohio should consider requiring customized emergency plans to fit the 
distinctive characteristics presented by the particular ecosystem of each 
well. These plans, assuming that they can be created and that they are 
well prepared, forward thinking, risk averse, accessible, and well 
communicated to those responsible for implementation, would be a 
good thing. It would have been better, in the Gulf, if emergency plans 
had been site specific, reviewed, and implemented. Ohio should learn 
from this example. It should require site-specific plans that accurately 
evaluate risk, identify response procedures, verify the training and 
availability of local response resources, and communicate with 
responders. 
To avoid the emergency planning inadequacies that arose in the 
Gulf, Ohio must be sure that emergency plans and procedures are well 
supported both in research and in the level of training and 
preparedness of the local resources on which the plans depend. Thus, 
it might be beneficial to perform a thorough study of how Ohio’s 
ecosystem would handle the various types of environmental 
consequences that could, in a worst-case scenario, arise as a result of a 
problem with a shale well. And, at a minimum, local emergency 
responders should be sufficiently numerous, informed, and prepared to 
act. Currently, state law requires the ODNR to inform county 
engineers and municipalities when a well is operational or when a 
company is preparing to drill a well in their area.305 To my knowledge, 
it requires no further follow-up or planning. 
To address the problem of on-the-ground resources, it might make 
sense for Ohio to do an inventory of fire suppression equipment in the 
region around each potential well. Also, Ohio needs a method for 
ensuring the adequacy of specialized training for local fire 
departments, so they can be prepared to respond effectively to an oil 
and gas accident at a well.306 At this point, the quality and level of 
coordination among the ODNR, local responders, and the Ohio EPA 
 
and gas resources inspector present unless permission has been granted 
by the chief.”). 
305. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.06(B) (discussing the reporting 
responsibilities of the chief). 
306. The Ohio Oil and Gas Energy Education Program (OOGEEP), a 
nonprofit organization funded exclusively by oil and gas producers 
operating in Ohio, provides oilfield emergency training programs for 
local emergency responders. OOGEEP has trained close to 1,000 Ohio 
firefighters on topics including evaluating the emergency, responding to 
production site emergencies, and responding to drilling site emergencies. 
The training programs are free and approved for continuing education 
for firefighters. See Responding to Oilfield Emergencies Training, 
OOGEEP.org, http://oogeep.org/event/firefighters-event-1/ (last visited 
May 11, 2013); see also Rhonda Reda, Responding to Oilfield 
Emergencies in Ohio, InCommand, Apr./May/June 2013, at 24. 
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is very unclear. Even if Ohio fails to institute a system of site-specific 
emergency planning, it should work on formal coordination of 
emergency planning and response efforts. There has been little, if any, 
coordination of emergency planning among the ODNR, Ohio EPA, 
drillers, and local emergency responders. Groups of County Engineers 
have developed and entered into agreements to require drilling 
companies to repair county roads.307 Ohio would benefit from similar 
coordination in efforts to prepare and plan for emergencies. 
Conclusion 
This Article presented three lessons that should have been learned 
from the BP Gulf oil spill disaster that began in the Gulf of Mexico on 
April 10, 2010. The Deepwater Horizon exploded and sank, killing 
eleven crewmembers and spewing oil into the Gulf waters and onto the 
Gulf coastline. Government and corporate teams have produced 
volumes of reports on their investigations of the events leading to the 
disaster, and responses to it, and their recommendations going forward. 
This Article highlighted three of the issues they identified and applied 
them to the developing shale industry in Ohio. It began by addressing 
internal conflicts of interest within the federal government’s primarily 
responsible agency, the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Minerals 
Management Service. It addressed failures in the Gulf to follow through 
on research or investigations that clearly were indicated as necessary 
and may have prevented disaster, responsibility for which lay both with 
the companies involved in the accident and the responsible agency. 
Finally, it addressed emergency planning and preparedness for disaster, 
which emerged as woefully inadequate in the Gulf. As Ohio moves 
quickly in developing its potentially lucrative shale oil and gas 
resources, Ohio should learn from the events in the Gulf and prevent 
accidents that could occur here, leading to loss of life and damage to 
the environment. 
In particular, this Article addressed the federal agency structure 
that was at work in the Gulf at the time of the disaster. It highlighted 
the role of the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Minerals 
Management Service, and focused on conflicts of interest within the 
MMS. The MMS developed the regulations applicable to deepwater 
drilling, and it was also responsible for encouraging production of Gulf 
 
307. See, e.g., Mark Law, County Requires Prevailing Wages, Intelligencer 
(Wheeling, W. Va.), Jan. 7, 2013, http://www.theintelligencer.net/page/ 
content.detail/id/579567/County-Requires-Prevailing-Wages.html?nav=510 
(“Jefferson County commissioners signed a road maintenance agreement 
with a company looking to build a large pipeline associated with the gas 
drilling industry across the county that requires contractors to pay 
prevailing wages to improve or repair county and township roads used 
in the construction process.”). 
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(and other) oil resources, and that responsibility included the leasing 
of drilling locations and the collection of revenues associated with 
production at those sites. Its responsibilities in leasing and revenue 
generation, which supported its role in encouraging production, and 
its responsibilities in regulation and enforcement, fundamentally 
conflicted with one another. In effect, MMS was attempting to carry 
out its duty to earn revenue for the U.S. Treasury by developing U.S. 
oil resources, while at the same time carrying out its duty to control 
the safety of the operations through the creation and enforcement of 
regulations. This conflict, coupled with other problems, such as 
underfunding, presented tensions that were unsustainable. 
Ohio’s agency structure, although similar in some important ways 
to the federal system, does not present the fundamental internal 
conflict-of-interest problems that were so apparent at the federal level. 
Although ODNR has statutory “sole and exclusive authority” to 
regulate the shale oil and gas operations in the state, ODNR, unlike 
MMS, does not handle leasing or revenue collection. But Ohio’s system 
of granting “sole and exclusive authority” to ODNR presents problems 
that are potentially in conflict with Ohio’s constitutional home rule 
provision308 because the legislature attempted, by statute, to eliminate 
all local regulation of oil and gas exploration and development. That is 
an issue for another day. 
The second lesson this Article addressed is that of the critical 
need to learn from what we experienced. I called this a lesson in 
research and follow-through. In the Gulf, the parties involved should 
have been aware that pressure problems were occurring in the well. 
They had experienced pressure problems previously at the same well, 
but there was not sufficient research to determine the causes of 
problem and thereby prevent a devastating reoccurrence. Although 
much was known in the Gulf about advances in deep-sea drilling, 
questions clearly remained about drilling and cementing techniques, 
which ultimately proved to be problematic. In Ohio, although much is 
known both about drilling for oil and gas in shale, and about 
hydraulic fracturing, the combination of these two techniques is not 
yet well studied. It is well known that accidents have occurred in the 
hydraulic fracturing of shale. There are not many, but it happens, and 
Ohio should attempt to learn from the shale well blowouts in, for 
example, North Dakota, which have damaged local drinking water 
aquifers. Ohio should also work to improve cleanup protocols. There 
are still many unknowns in Ohio regarding the potential effects of a 
blowout, either at a shale wellhead or “downhole” in the well, and the 
ecosystems that would be damaged by this kind of event. We could 
learn more about cleanup techniques suitable to the ecosystems in 
which shale wells are located. Ohio could work on follow-through—for 
 
308. Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 3.  
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example, by ensuring that the extra inspectors that were promised by 
statute are actually hired and that the chemical disclosure programs 
that have been discussed come to fruition. 
Finally, this Article considered lessons in emergency preparedness. 
It is well known that the governments and companies involved in the 
blowout in the Gulf were shamefully unprepared, at least in the first 
instance, to respond to a disaster of the magnitude that occurred. 
Emergency plans were not site specific. There were insufficient 
resources on the ground (and in the water). Cleanup systems were not 
well understood for the environment in question. Ohio could learn 
from these inadequacies and build a system of site-specific emergency 
plans in which Ohioans accurately identify and prepare for worst-case 
accidents at individual sites and thereby ensure that communication 
systems are functional and resources are adequately trained and ready 
to respond. 
In these ways, and certainly in countless others, Ohio can learn 
from mistakes that were made in the Gulf. As Ohio moves quickly 
and decisively in developing its rich shale oil and gas resources, it 
should continue to act deliberately. It should pay close attention to 
research needs, enforcement priorities, and emergency planning. 
  
 
   
